Misinformation is not new, but the speed and scale at which it can be manufactured and spread has changed dramatically. Across Southeast Asia, falsehoods and manipulated media are increasingly common during elections, around territorial disputes, and in extremist spaces. A recent analysis by Dien Nguyen An Luong makes a useful point: Singapore’s 2027 ASEAN Chairmanship could turn these frustrations into a concrete regional exercise. Instead of each country chasing its own online ghosts, ASEAN members could learn to connect the dots. The idea is not to create a giant censorship body, but to help national investigators see when separate incidents are actually one coordinated operation. The challenges are real and varied. There are electoral falsehoods, AI-generated extremist content, geopolitical manipulation, and outright deepfakes. Some of these problems are homegrown, rooted in domestic politics. Others involve actors and networks that cross borders. For policymakers, the worry is not merely that false claims exist online. It is that those claims can mislead voters, inflame nationalist sentiment, and turn complex territorial disputes into emotional confrontations. AI-generated content makes this harder because it can be tailored to exploit existing loyalties. During Indonesia’s 2024 election, for example, fabricated speeches attributed to political figures circulated online. Research found that voters’ existing political loyalties influenced which deepfakes they believed. That suggests AI-generated misinformation does not just fool people; it can reinforce the very divisions that already make democratic debate difficult. Similarly, misleading videos about the South China Sea have claimed that the Philippines attacked and destroyed Chinese vessels. One reused footage from a military exercise; another used fabricated news reports. These videos can whip up nationalist passion and make it harder for ordinary people to assess what is actually happening. There is also the disturbing possibility of extremists using AI to create sensational content, such as TikTok videos depicting dead militants in terrorist attacks. The technology does not create the underlying grievances, but it can make extremist narratives more vivid, more shareable, and more dangerous.
Yet the fact that several ASEAN countries face similar misinformation challenges does not automatically mean they need a regional response. Some problems are best handled closer to home. Local journalists and fact-checkers who know a country’s politics and language are better positioned to spot fabricated speeches targeting candidates in an Indonesian election than an international body would be. Even foreign interference does not always merit an ASEAN-wide intervention. Consider an October 2025 Reuters investigation that uncovered a Chinese-funded operation using a Manila-based marketing firm to spread messages supporting Beijing’s interests and discrediting the United States in the Philippines. The operation relied on fake Filipino social media identities, making the messages appear to come from local users rather than an external sponsor. But while a foreign sponsor was involved, the investigation did not establish that the same campaign extended to other ASEAN countries. This distinction matters. Foreign involvement alone does not necessarily make something a regional problem. Calling in ASEAN for every foreign-backed influence operation would be overreach and could drain attention from cases where regional cooperation truly adds value. A stronger case arises when related deceptive campaigns appear to concern more than one ASEAN country. In July 2026, a CNA investigation uncovered more than 550 TikTok videos from 30 accounts spreading misleading claims about Singapore and Malaysia. Some videos claimed that China’s Hainan Free Trade Port would undermine Singapore’s position as a major shipping hub. Others claimed that policies sidelining ethnic Chinese had held back Malaysia’s development. The accounts reused scripts and synthetic presenters, suggesting a coordinated production network. But the investigation could not determine who operated the accounts or whether a foreign government was behind it. This is precisely the kind of situation where ASEAN cooperation could help. Investigators in different countries could compare their findings on the accounts, narratives, and distribution patterns involved. They could identify cross-border links and determine whether isolated incidents are actually part of a broader regional operation.
ASEAN has not started from scratch. Member states have already agreed on some basic principles. A 2018 framework called for cooperation on fact-checking and media literacy. A 2023 guideline drew a distinction between misinformation, or false information spread unintentionally, and disinformation, which is deliberately spread to deceive. These are useful foundations, but coordinated influence operations present a different challenge. They may involve fake accounts or concealed sponsorship even when some messages are factually accurate. The problem is not always deciding whether a claim is true or false. It is figuring out who is behind a campaign and how it is orchestrated. ASEAN could help member states investigate those questions without forcing them to agree on disputed domestic political claims. That is an important point. A country may not want ASEAN colleagues telling it what to believe about its own politics. But it may welcome help tracing a network of fake accounts that appears to be operating across borders. In this sense, ASEAN’s role would not be to arbitrate truth. It would be to provide a platform for investigators to share technical findings, compare account clusters, and spot patterns that a single country would miss. The existing guidelines and task forces are useful, but they are not enough. ASEAN’s Digital Literacy Programme, for example, reported reaching nearly 194,000 people through workshops by November 2023. That sounds impressive, but participation figures do not tell us whether people actually became better at identifying misinformation. Nor does any of this establish whether ASEAN has tested joint investigations of deceptive networks operating across borders.
There is a real gap between issuing guidelines and conducting practical cooperation. The European Union offers one model. The European External Action Service has investigated foreign information manipulation by examining the networks, intermediaries, and infrastructure used in coordinated campaigns. Its FIMI Explorer tool helps investigators trace connections between operations. Meanwhile, the EU’s Digital Services Act Transparency Database publishes platforms’ reasons for removing or restricting content, making those decisions open to public scrutiny. ASEAN cannot simply copy this approach because it lacks the EU’s legal powers to compel such disclosures from technology companies. But it can still adapt the investigative methods and explore a regional incident-reporting network. Some relevant measures in ASEAN’s 2026–2035 Work Plan for Information and Media are scheduled for 2029 or later. Singapore could use its 2027 ASEAN Chairmanship to propose earlier trials of selected measures. The goal would not be to launch a massive new bureaucracy on day one. It would be to test whether a modest network of investigators from interested member states, independent researchers, and social media platforms can share enough information to catch cross-border campaigns in the act. By comparing where content first appeared, which accounts or scripts were reused, and what remains unknown about the operators, they could see whether the same networks are behind campaigns targeting different countries. Without such a process, each country might investigate the same set of fake accounts separately, wasting time and reaching only partial conclusions.
One starting point is to make cross-border deceptive campaigns easier to investigate. Under Action 5.8 of ASEAN’s work plan, member states are encouraged to cooperate against cross-border threats involving the misuse of digital technologies. Through ASEAN’s information-sector officials, and under Singapore’s chairmanship, the bloc could test the proposed incident-reporting network against a handful of suspected cross-border campaigns. This would allow ASEAN members, social media platforms, and researchers to compare findings in a structured way. Another issue is what social media platforms reveal about deceptive campaigns. Under Action 5.11, ASEAN envisages reports on takedowns of misinformation. But knowing how many posts were removed tells investigators little about who is behind deceptive campaigns, how the accounts are connected, or whether the same networks operate across different countries. TikTok already publishes reports on covert influence operations, which provide a useful starting point. But these reports alone may not establish whether the same operators are behind deceptive campaigns targeting different ASEAN countries. Singapore could bring together interested members and independent researchers to compare these reports against findings from existing investigations. Where information is missing, they should ask platforms for clarification. Even if the platforms decline, the exercise would still establish what investigators know and what remains unclear. Nor would it require governments to disclose their own takedown requests. Better reporting is only part of the response. Investigators also need the skills to check the material behind suspected deceptive campaigns. Under Action 2.12, ASEAN proposes training hubs covering fact-checking and the use of AI tools in newsrooms. Singapore could build on these earlier efforts by giving the proposed training a practical focus. That might include using AI-assisted translation to compare claims across languages, checking whether audio or video has been manipulated, and tracing the reuse of scripts or synthetic presenters. Independent fact-checkers, journalists, and researchers could practise these checks together. Participants could be tested on sample material before and after training, without compromising their editorial independence. In other words, the aim is not to create propaganda for any government. It is to build a shared set of investigative skills that makes it harder for deceptive networks to hide in plain sight.
Ultimately, the onus is not on ASEAN to intervene every time misinformation surfaces in one of its member states. Many problems are best solved at the national or local level. But when deceptive campaigns involve actors and networks operating across borders, individual countries may struggle to see the full picture. The 2027 chairmanship offers Singapore a chance to ask a practical question: can ASEAN cooperation actually close that gap? The answer is not guaranteed. It will depend on whether member states are willing to share findings, whether platforms are willing to provide meaningful information, and whether investigators can learn to work together despite differences in legal systems and political sensitivities. But the cost of trying is relatively low. A pilot incident-reporting network, a few targeted training exercises, and a willingness to ask platforms hard questions would not create a perfect system. They would, however, tell ASEAN whether regional cooperation on misinformation is worth pursuing at a deeper level. That matters because the threats are likely to grow. AI tools are becoming cheaper and more sophisticated. Elections will continue to be contested. Territorial disputes will not disappear. If ASEAN countries wait until a coordinated cross-border campaign causes serious damage, it will be too late. Singapore’s 2027 chairmanship can set the tone for the organisation’s next decade by showing that ASEAN is willing to adapt to the digital age. It can also mark a shift from talking about misinformation to testing concrete ways of investigating it. The goal is not to eliminate all falsehoods online. That would be impossible. The goal is to make it harder for unseen actors to manipulate people across the region by keeping their operations in the shadows. If ASEAN can help reveal those shadows, it will have done something genuinely useful. And that may be one of the most important legacies of the organisation’s 60th year.