The Propaganda Machine Behind Myanmar’s New President: A Humanized Analysis

On a warm April morning, Myanmar’s most powerful general traded his military uniform for a traditional longyi and stepped into the role of president, completing a carefully choreographed political transformation that had been months in the making. Senior General Min Aung Hlaing’s inauguration was far more than a simple changing of the guard—it represented the culmination of an elaborate propaganda campaign that had been quietly taking shape since January 2025. Understanding this sophisticated information machine matters not just for those who study Myanmar closely, but for every government in the region now weighing whether to embrace the country’s new leadership or maintain their distance. The decision to normalize relations with this new government carries profound implications, and the propaganda apparatus that helped create it deserves careful scrutiny.

The junta’s information operation operates on multiple levels, each designed to reach different audiences with tailored messaging. At the most obvious end of the spectrum sit the government-run publications—the Global New Light of Myanmar and the military’s own Myawady Daily—whose content is so clearly state-controlled that even casual readers dismiss it as pure propaganda. But the more sophisticated and concerning layer is the Myanmar Narrative Think Tank, established under the Ministry of Information in January 2025 with its own public website and an impressive roster of founding members. These individuals were carefully selected to provide a civilian face for the military regime, each bringing specific credentials to cover different narrative domains. The group includes Ko Ko, a media executive with roots in the previous military era; Dr. Zaw Oo, an economist with international academic credentials and connections to respected research institutions; Dr. Naing Swe Oo, a Russia-trained former military officer who runs a defense research institute; and Dr. Khin Maung Lwin, a former health ministry official. Several members had previously participated in peace processes and maintained connections to the former democratic government, lending an air of credibility and experience that uniformed generals simply cannot provide. The think tank’s inaugural event in March 2025 demonstrated its approach perfectly—a grand forum in Naypyidaw featuring speakers from Russia, China, India, Nepal, and Thailand, each lending regional legitimacy to the proceedings while the generals looked on.

Beneath the think tank sits CNI Myanmar, a news agency established in 2021 that claims to operate on principles of independence and neutrality but bears all the hallmarks of a propaganda outlet designed to look like legitimate journalism. Unlike the cruder government newspapers, CNI publishes headlines that appear plausible to the uninformed reader—stories that are carefully crafted to seem newsworthy while consistently supporting the junta’s narrative. The agency has no named editors, no disclosed ownership, and has never once challenged military red lines, even as more than twenty independent outlets have lost their licenses and over two hundred journalists have been arrested since the coup. CNI publishes think tank statements verbatim, adopts the junta’s framing on sensitive issues like the Rohingya crisis, and presents the rubber-stamp parliament as a normal democratic institution. What it never mentions is the airstrikes on civilian areas, the conditions faced by political prisoners, the battlefield losses, or the continued detention of Aung San Suu Kyi. To a reader lacking context, CNI’s output might genuinely resemble real local journalism—which is precisely the point. In a media environment where independent reporters have been killed, arrested, or forced into exile, CNI has stepped in to fill the void with content that looks like news but functions as something far more insidious.

The think tank’s international reach expanded dramatically in August 2025 when Ko Ko personally signed an agreement with Xinhua, China’s state news agency, formally connecting Myanmar’s junta to Beijing’s Global South Joint Communication Partnership Program. This network, launched at the BRICS Media Forum, connects Myanmar’s propaganda output to an astonishing 260 institutions across 110 countries, all working to counter what Beijing calls Western “cognitive warfare.” Russia plays a complementary role, providing weapons, diplomatic cover at the United Nations, and state media support defending Myanmar’s political transition. When Russia’s Security Council Secretary met with Myanmar’s military leaders in early 2026, he directly promised comprehensive assistance in the international arena, acknowledging that both nations face Western pressure. This global amplification network means that propaganda generated in Naypyidaw can reach audiences across Asia, Africa, and Latin America within hours, wrapped in the credibility of established state media outlets. The architecture functions like a well-oiled machine: the think tank generates legitimizing narratives, CNI distributes them domestically with a veneer of editorial independence, and Xinhua and Russian state media spread them internationally to audiences that might otherwise never encounter Myanmar’s propaganda at all.

The intended audience for this sophisticated operation is primarily regional. ASEAN governments need some narrative justification for normalizing relations with Myanmar’s military government, and the propaganda machine provides exactly that cover. Since becoming president, Min Aung Hlaing has hosted foreign ministers from China, Thailand, and Malaysia, with Cambodia and Laos also signaling willingness to engage in bilateral talks. Each diplomatic visit has been preceded by a wave of media content emphasizing Myanmar’s economic stability and supposed democratic progress. Investigative research has documented coordinated disinformation networks that place fabricated analytical pieces across multiple pay-to-publish websites, each story citing unnamed analysts and designed to create the false impression of independent corroboration. This cross-border deployment of the CNI method appears to be working—the junta’s strategy of fracturing ASEAN’s collective non-recognition through bilateral normalization is succeeding, and the Five-Point Consensus that ASEAN adopted as its framework for engaging Myanmar is effectively dead, killed in part by information operations designed to make engagement palatable.

Yet the democratic opposition possesses advantages that no amount of sophisticated propaganda can replicate. The National Unity Government, ethnic armed organizations, and People’s Defense Forces collectively control large areas of Myanmar’s territory and borders, enjoying legitimacy earned through five years of resistance against a military that has killed more than ninety-five thousand of its own citizens. This legitimacy is the resistance’s most powerful communication asset, something no PR contract can purchase. The resistance also has truth on its side—independent outlets including the Irrawaddy, Mizzima, DVB, and Myanmar Now reach an estimated twenty million people globally, and their reporting is trusted precisely because it is produced under conditions of extreme personal risk. Casualty data, detention figures, and documentation of atrocities provide a factual record that stands in stark contrast to the platitudes of the think tank and the empty headlines of CNI. When resistance leaders give honest assessments of setbacks, describing progress as “two steps forward, one step back,” international media covers it extensively because the candor contrasts so starkly with the junta’s staged performances. This credible, unscripted communication builds the kind of long-term trust that propaganda cannot achieve, and the recent formation of a unified political framework for major resistance forces demonstrates that an alternative political reality exists, regardless of what state-backed websites publish.

Still, the information asymmetry presents real challenges. The junta has signed a multi-million-dollar contract with a Washington-based public relations firm to lobby the United States government, while independent Myanmar media outlets face an existential funding crisis. Cuts to international aid, the expected end of Swedish media funding, and pullbacks by European donors have drastically reduced the budgets of key independent outlets. Burma News International has reportedly been forced to cancel radio programming that warned communities in conflict zones about incoming airstrikes—programming that literally saves lives. As researchers have noted, if this independent media ecosystem collapses, it could take years to rebuild. Supporting independent Myanmar journalism is not merely a matter of principle but a strategic imperative. Every dollar that reaches independent outlets undermines the propaganda network, exposes the think tank’s distortions, and helps maintain ASEAN governments’ visibility of the junta’s conduct. The resistance has the stronger story to tell and the moral authority to tell it. What it desperately needs is the infrastructure to ensure that story reaches the audiences whose perceptions will shape Myanmar’s regional standing and its people’s fate.