On a gray Monday in early October, the men and women who normally spend their lives in sealed meeting rooms, speaking in hushed tones about secrets that never reach the public, took a remarkable step into the daylight. The annual public hearing of Germany’s intelligence oversight committee is one of the few moments each year when the presidents of the Federal Intelligence Service (BND), the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitutional Order (BfV), and the Military Counterintelligence Service (MAD) answer questions in an open room. Normally, their conversations with the Bundestag’s oversight committee happen in secure facilities protected from electronic eavesdropping, and the details are strictly confidential. But since 2016, one session each year has been open to journalists and to citizens who register in advance. On that day, those present saw three intelligence chiefs who were visibly concerned. Their message was not one of alarmism, but of a hard-nosed professional assessment: Germany is in the crosshairs of the Kremlin. BfV President Zinan Zelen put it bluntly: military scenarios that NATO experts had once predicted for 2029 were now “already a reality” in the secret world of intelligence. His counterpart at the BND, Martin Jaeger, was equally frank. While there was no evidence of an immediate conventional military attack on Germany, no other state currently posed such a direct, comprehensive, and concrete threat. The country, Jaeger warned, risked being dragged into a violent conflict with Russia without a single shot being fired on German soil in a traditional sense. It was a striking image: the guardians of Germany’s secrets, usually invisible by design, standing in front of cameras and microphones to tell citizens that the danger was real, present, and unlike anything seen since the Cold War.
According to Jaeger, Russia is not preparing for a land invasion of Germany in the classical sense. Instead, it is waging what intelligence experts call a shadow war. The instruments are sabotage, cyberattacks, disinformation, and espionage, combined with covert operations designed to intimidate political leaders and confuse the public. Moscow is trying to undermine trust in democratic institutions by making it impossible to know what is real and what is manufactured. Both Jaeger and Zelen stressed that Germany is not a random target. Germany has become one of Ukraine’s most important supporters, providing military, financial, humanitarian, and economic aid. From the Kremlin’s perspective, Germany stands as a major obstacle to the projection of Russian hegemonic power in Europe. If Germany were to waver, the stability of the entire European continent and the European consensus behind Ukraine could collapse. This is exactly what Moscow seems to want. The Russian leadership, Zelen explained, is engaged in coldly calculated destabilization operations designed to foster uncertainty, weaken social resilience, and slowly normalize a state of permanent confrontation. The intelligence services have observed a growing willingness to go beyond traditional espionage. Acts of sabotage and even targeted assassinations are no longer unthinkable. Critical infrastructure—transport routes, military installations, and the defense industry—is considered especially vulnerable. This is not the classic warfare of the twentieth century, with tank battalions and marching soldiers. It is a quieter, more insidious form of aggression, one that can escalate and de-escalate according to Moscow’s wishes, and one that makes it easier for the Kremlin to deny responsibility even as the effects are felt in German ports, railway hubs, and government networks.
The wider war in Ukraine is closely connected to this shadow war. The intelligence chiefs believe the conflict may be entering a decisive phase. Russia intends to keep military pressure on Ukraine throughout the coming winter, while simultaneously doing everything possible to disrupt Western supply lines for arms shipments. The authorities pointed to a specific incident as a warning: in August, a drone packed with explosives was discovered at Leipzig-Halle Airport, near a Ukrainian cargo plane. Zelen said there were clear indications of Russian involvement. This was not a scene from a spy novel; it was a concrete example of sabotage reaching deep into German territory. At the same time, the BfV is observing a dangerous evolution in how Russia recruits its foot soldiers. Rather than sending in highly trained spies, Moscow increasingly relies on “low-level agents”—ordinary people who are contacted through social media and digital platforms and paid to carry out tasks such as surveillance, transportation, or even attacks. “Social media plays a key role here,” Zelen noted. These expendable individuals are deliberately kept separate from the Russian state, making them harder to trace and easier to discard. Even more worrying, Zelen said, is the possibility that Russian intelligence and organized crime are beginning to cooperate. Security agencies will have to prepare for a future in which criminal networks provide logistics, safe houses, or deniability for state-directed operations. There is no room for complacency even in the absence of signs of an imminent invasion. Russia is deliberately testing and blurring borders. The BND noted drone flights over NATO territory and violations of Moldovan airspace. Jaeger described this as a slow, deliberate push towards a new normality. He also recalled the “little green men” who appeared in Crimea in 2014—Russian commandos without insignia—and warned that similar ambiguous operations could be used against individual NATO members, particularly in the Baltic region, to probe the Alliance’s unity and readiness to respond.
In the midst of all this danger, a natural question emerges: would Germany be safer if it simply stopped supporting Ukraine? Jaeger’s answer was unequivocal. No, he said—providing assistance to Kyiv is in Germany’s vital interest. Those who believe that ending support would also end the conflict with Russia are mistaken. The logic is straightforward but sobering. Russia’s war against Ukraine is not a local dispute; it is a challenge to the European security order. If Ukraine were defeated, the consequences for Germany and Europe would be severe. There would be more instability on the continent, new waves of displacement, a weakened Europe, and a Kremlin emboldened to test its power further. From the intelligence services’ perspective, supporting Ukraine is not an act of charity; it is a strategic investment in Germany’s own security. The cost of backing down, they argue, would be far higher than the cost of standing firm. This is not a hawkish enthusiasm for war, but a cold calculation based on years of intelligence showing that Russia’s ambitions reach beyond Ukraine. The chiefs were careful to explain that they are not predicting an imminent invasion of German territory. But they are warning that a Russian victory in Ukraine would radically change the balance of power in Europe and make every Western country more vulnerable to the same tactics of intimidation and destabilization. In that sense, the shadow war now being waged against Germany is not an accident or a misunderstanding. It is a deliberate attempt to weaken European resolve before a potentially larger conflict. The intelligence chiefs seemed to be saying: the best way to prevent a war is to make the cost of aggression unacceptable. They were not speaking as politicians promising easy solutions. They were speaking as professionals who have read the intercepted communications, counted the sabotage attempts, and watched the maps change. And their conclusion was clear: retreating in the face of blackmail only invites more blackmail.
While Russia occupied most of the spotlight, the intelligence chiefs also reminded the public that other dangers remain on the horizon. China, they said, is a long-term strategic challenge. The BfV continues to warn about attempts to acquire German expertise through research partnerships, exchange programmes, and universities. The fields of particular interest are predictable: artificial intelligence, quantum technology, hypersonic weapons, and biotechnology. These are the technologies that will define the balance of power in the coming decades, and Beijing is eager to shorten its path by tapping into German knowledge. Another concern is the spread of Chinese technology products into everyday life. Connected vehicles, household appliances, and industrial systems collect enormous amounts of data that could be misused by foreign intelligence services. In an extreme scenario, the authorities said, a government might even remotely shut down systems that had been built with hidden vulnerabilities. This is not a reason to panic, the chiefs suggested, but it is a reason to think carefully about digital dependence. On another front, the threat of right-wing extremism remains a central issue for domestic security. Zelen described an extremely worrying trend: extremist groups are becoming more action-oriented, more willing to use violence, and more successful at attracting younger members. The scene is increasingly internationalized, with networking across borders and radicalization occurring on social media platforms. What worries the BfV is not only the existence of these groups, but the way they feed on broader social anger and prepare an atmosphere in which political violence seems acceptable. MAD President Martina Rozenberg added her own concern: the Bundeswehr is not immune. The number of suspected extremism cases in the military has increased, reflecting broader radicalization in German society. The armed forces, which must be trusted with weapons and secrets, are struggling with the same polarizing currents affecting the rest of the country. In a democracy, the chiefs insisted, state institutions cannot isolate themselves from society, but they must not be allowed to become battlegrounds for extremists.
Given the scale of these threats, it is no surprise that the intelligence chiefs used the public hearing to defend the planned reform of Germany’s security services. The government wants to turn the BND and BfV into what is being called “fully equipped intelligence services.” In practical terms, this means significantly more authority to collect, store, and automatically analyse data. It also means, for the first time, the power to take active countermeasures—including digital counterattacks against those who launch sabotage or cyberattacks against Germany. Zelen argued that in a time of geopolitical instability, systemic rivalry, and hybrid aggression, specialized capabilities and strong security systems are more essential than ever. Jaeger was even more direct: “If we get these powers, we will use them. And our adversaries will feel the consequences.” But the proposal has generated anxious questions in Germany’s political and civil-liberties communities. Critics argue that the line between intelligence gathering and police intervention is becoming dangerously blurred. Konstantin von Noz, a Green politician on the parliamentary oversight committee, said the expansion of powers must be accompanied by much stricter supervision. He expects the Federal Constitutional Court to examine the planned reform, and it is likely that the justices will have a great deal to say about the balance between security and freedom. Germany has not forgotten its history, and any move towards stronger surveillance inevitably touches a sensitive nerve. The hearing ended with a sense of unease. The intelligence chiefs had done something unusual: they had spoken openly, not to frighten the public, but to prepare it. They asked citizens to understand that the comfortable world of the last decades is being tested. They asked politicians to give them the tools they need. And they asked everyone to accept that security in a digital, hybrid age comes with difficult trade-offs. Whether the German public will accept those trade-offs remains an open question. What is clear is that the old certainties are gone, and the intelligence services are no longer whispering about dangers that may one day arrive—they are warning about dangers that are already here.