It’s as if a familiar, unsettling shadow is stretching across Europe again, but this time, it’s making its way into neighborhoods we thought were safe. Imagine a neighbor who always seems to find a reason to meddle in your affairs, even invent them if necessary, to push their own agenda. That’s essentially what Russia is doing, according to an expert named Thomas Nurcombe. He’s sounding the alarm, specifically about Latvia, a country that now feels like it’s caught in Russia’s crosshairs. It’s not about direct, open conflict yet, but something far more insidious: a “false flag” operation, where Russia would create a pretext, a manufactured grievance, to justify military intervention beyond its own borders. This isn’t just a hypothetical fear; it’s a strategy Russia has honed over time, and all the signs suggest it’s being deployed against NATO territory.
The concern isn’t just theoretical; Russia is actually laying down legal and informational groundwork for these potential interventions. Think of it like this: they’re not just thinking about it, they’re preparing the paperwork and spreading the stories. Nurcombe, who’s a research manager at the Coalition for Global Prosperity, points to Russia’s parliament granting President Vladimir Putin new powers. These powers would allow him to deploy troops overseas if Russian citizens or “compatriots” are arrested, detained, or face criminal prosecution. While Putin hasn’t always needed parliamentary approval for such moves, Nurcombe interprets this as a clear signal of Russia’s continued willingness to invent excuses for intervention. He stresses that Russia’s long-standing narrative of “protecting compatriots” is far from a defensive stance. Instead, it’s a strategic smokescreen, a tool dressed up as protection, but actually designed to expand Russia’s influence and boundaries. This isn’t about genuinely caring for people; it’s about power and territory, cloaked in a narrative that sounds noble but serves an entirely different purpose.
This playbook, Nurcombe explains, isn’t new. It’s a strategy with roots tracing back centuries, continually re-emerging throughout Russian history. The idea of a unified “Russian World” has consistently served as a powerful tool to legitimize territorial expansion. Under Putin’s leadership, this historical narrative has been dusted off and weaponized. We saw it play out devastatingly in Ukraine. First, it was used to justify the annexation of Crimea in 2014, and then, horrifically, the full-scale invasion in 2022. In both instances, Russia orchestrated massive disinformation campaigns, painting Russian-speaking populations as victims under threat, needing “liberation” from a hostile government. Nurcombe warns that these same destructive narratives are now being strategically deployed across the Baltic states, with Latvia being a prime target. The goal is to sow discord, unravel social cohesion, and erode public trust in government institutions. By intentionally escalating ethnic tensions through carefully crafted disinformation, Russia aims to create conditions that it can later exploit, using them as a flimsy rationale for military action against countries that are members of NATO – a move that would have catastrophic global implications.
Latvia, unfortunately, presents a particularly vulnerable target for this kind of manipulation due to its unique demographics. Imagine a country where nearly a quarter of the population identifies as ethnically Russian, and roughly a third speaks Russian as their primary language. In a city like Daugavpils, nestled near the borders of Russia and Belarus, almost half the residents are ethnically Russian. These deep-seated divisions are precisely what Russia is exploiting through sophisticated and targeted media influence. Even though Latvia has imposed restrictions on Russian state media in recent years, Kremlin-backed content still finds its way to audiences. Think of the digital equivalent of sneaking through back alleys: VPNs, mirrored websites, and messaging apps like Telegram become conduits for propaganda. Estimates from the Atlantic Council reveal a stark reality: approximately 20 percent of Russian-speaking viewers in Latvia continue to access these banned Russian television channels. Nurcombe
claims that Russian intelligence services are actively leveraging these channels to propagate narratives of discrimination against Russian speakers, circulating inflammatory stories about “Russophobia,” forced deportations, and deliberate attempts to provoke conflict with Moscow.
The consequences of these calculated campaigns are already manifesting, according to Nurcombe. Latvia’s State Security Service reported in 2024 a disturbing trend: nearly a quarter of aggressive social media comments were explicitly aimed at inciting ethnic or social hatred, while an equally alarming proportion included direct threats against state officials. This isn’t just online noise; it’s a reflection of deeper societal fissures being stoked. Nurcombe also draws a poignant parallel to the COVID-19 pandemic, illustrating the very real-world dangers of disinformation. During the pandemic, conspiracy theories about Western vaccines circulated widely within Russian-speaking communities. This propaganda led to significantly lower vaccination rates among these groups, which, predictably, resulted in disproportionately higher hospitalization rates. It’s a stark reminder that what starts as information warfare can have tragic human costs. While Latvia and its Baltic neighbors have proactively taken steps to bolster their resilience against these hostile information campaigns, Nurcombe cautions that these efforts, while vital, are not impenetrable. Vulnerabilities still exist, and Russia is intent on exploiting every single one.
Nurcombe issues a final, urgent warning: Russia’s recent legislative maneuvers should not be seen as isolated incidents. They are, he insists, integral parts of a much larger, deeply entrenched, and long-standing strategic game plan. To simply dismiss these Russian disinformation efforts as being confined to Ukraine, or as irrelevant to NATO territory, would be a catastrophic mistake. He writes, “Failing to recognise that Russian disinformation efforts go beyond Ukraine and into NATO territory risks the potential for future illegal landgrabs.” Such actions, he warns, could easily be spun as “liberation” operations, mirroring the deceitful tactics used in Ukraine. The chilling implication is clear: such a scenario could ignite a much broader European conflict. Nurcombe’s concluding thought paints a grim picture: “In such an eventuality,” he adds, “Europe could once again face the prospect of full-scale war.” It’s a stark reminder that the shadows of history often return, especially when we fail to heed the warnings woven into the fabric of the present.