Poland’s Vulnerability to Disinformation Exposed: Commission Report Urges Sweeping Reforms
Warsaw – A damning new report by a government-appointed commission has revealed the extent of Poland’s vulnerability to foreign disinformation campaigns, primarily originating from Russia. The report, released on Friday, paints a grim picture of insufficient countermeasures, institutional failures, and a lack of coordinated strategy, leaving Poland susceptible to manipulation and undermining its national security. The commission, headed by Gen. Jarosław Stróżyk, chief of Poland’s Military Counterintelligence Service, issued a stark warning, urging immediate and comprehensive action to combat the escalating threat.
The report, focusing primarily on the period since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, highlights Russia’s relentless pursuit of "informational dominance" through a sophisticated arsenal of tactics. These include diplomatic maneuvering, pervasive propaganda, targeted psychological campaigns, cyber infiltration, and sophisticated hacking attacks. The commission pointed to the significant role played by malicious actors like the hacker group Ghostwriter/UNC 1151, known for its destabilizing activities in Central Europe. With Russia estimated to spend between USD 2 billion and USD 4 billion annually on disinformation and propaganda, the report underscores the sheer scale of the challenge confronting Poland.
The commission’s findings expose a series of critical weaknesses in Poland’s defense against disinformation. The report criticizes the previous government’s "insufficient, ad hoc, inconsistent, and often superficial" approach to counter-disinformation efforts. A lack of coordination between key institutions, including the foreign ministry, is highlighted as a major impediment. The absence of a comprehensive long-term strategy, coupled with limited countermeasures primarily focused on monitoring, training, and vague cooperation guidelines, left Poland ill-equipped to effectively counter sophisticated information warfare tactics. The report further alleges that former authorities failed to act decisively on available intelligence regarding individuals and organizations disseminating pro-Russian and pro-Belarusian disinformation, further exacerbating the problem.
The report identifies a pivotal setback in 2015: the controversial disruption of a planned NATO counterintelligence center in Warsaw, specifically designed to combat Russian disinformation efforts. The forced entry into the NATO Counterintelligence Center of Excellence by associates of then-Defense Minister Antoni Macierewicz, led by his aide Bartłomiej Misiewicz, is described as a severe blow to Poland’s and NATO’s ability to counter cognitive warfare. The unauthorized access to classified materials within the center, which had been operational for only a few months, raised serious concerns about Poland’s handling of NATO-affiliated institutions. Independent legal analyses later confirmed that the center operated under international jurisdiction, beyond the authority of Polish officials.
The 80-page report, available on the justice ministry’s website, provides a comprehensive analysis of Russian cognitive warfare techniques targeting Poland. It delves into specific Russian strategies, disseminates major propaganda narratives, and assesses Poland’s preparedness to counteract such tactics. The report includes detailed case studies examining disinformation campaigns related to the COVID-19 pandemic, the migration crisis at the Polish-Belarusian border, climate change issues, and Russian interference in elections in Georgia, Moldova, and Romania in 2024. These case studies offer valuable insights into the evolving nature of disinformation and the urgent need for robust countermeasures.
Gen. Stróżyk emphasized the need for immediate and significant improvements in Poland’s institutional response to disinformation. He stressed that the report’s central message is the necessity for a more comprehensive approach, both institutionally and practically, to combat disinformation originating from Russia and Belarus, as well as other emerging threats in the information landscape. The report criticizes specific decisions by the previous government, including the abandonment of plans for a dedicated cybersecurity department within the Internal Security Agency in 2016 and the inadequate resourcing of the foreign ministry’s Strategic Communications Unit and the National Research Institute’s Disinformation Prevention Department.
The commission has outlined a series of recommendations to bolster Poland’s defenses. These include fostering closer cooperation between government authorities and media outlets, particularly during crises, to ensure timely and accurate information dissemination. The report suggests that public institutions should provide journalists with direct access to eyewitnesses and uncensored visual materials to counteract the spread of manipulated narratives. It also proposes the declassification and publication of intelligence reports on disinformation threats to enhance public awareness. Crucially, the report advocates for a comprehensive national anti-disinformation strategy, incorporating input from experts, journalists, and civil society organizations, supported by increased public funding. In a further development, Gen. Stróżyk announced that the commission will submit a report to prosecutors within ten days regarding the dismantling of regional offices of the Internal Security Agency under the previous government, a move previously criticized for weakening Poland’s intelligence capabilities. The commission, established in May 2023 as an advisory body to the prime minister, focuses on analyzing state documents, academic research, and expert reports to assess foreign influence on Polish public life. Its next report is anticipated in March.