Three weeks have passed since the announcement of parliamentary elections in Serbia, and the campaign has already produced a striking amount of misinformation. In the messy, fast-moving world of an election season, falsehoods and half-truths can easily outpace the facts, shaping how voters see candidates, parties, and even the electoral process itself. The team at FakeNews Tragač, a Serbian fact-checking project, has been closely watching the media and social networks since the campaign began, systematically recording cases of disinformation. What they found is both revealing and worrying. In the first three weeks of monitoring, they confirmed 23 distinct cases of disinformation, each one carefully examined and verified. That number may not sound enormous, but it represents only the cases that could be conclusively proven as false or manipulative; the true scale of misleading content is likely larger. These cases were not random or accidental. They followed patterns, targeted specific groups, and used recognizable manipulation techniques. This overview breaks down the main themes, the methods behind the falsehoods, and the actors most often caught up in the disinformation. By laying out these findings, the fact-checkers hope to give voters a clearer picture of what they are up against, and to remind everyone that a healthy democracy depends on being able to separate fact from fiction.
The most prominent theme in the disinformation recorded so far is identity and national issues. This is not entirely surprising, as questions of nationhood, history, and cultural loyalty are deeply sensitive in Serbia, and they can be used to quickly discredit a political opponent. In every single case recorded under this theme, the target was the student-led electoral list, a group that has become a significant force in the election. The tabloids and anonymous social media profiles behind these manipulations tried to attach unpopular positions to the students, hoping to paint them as unpatriotic or hostile to Serbian traditions. For example, Ilija Srdanović, the first candidate on the student list, was falsely accused of recognizing the independence of Kosovo, a claim that would be damaging in the Serbian political context. He was also accused of lying about his participation in the traditional Orthodox Epiphany ritual of swimming for the Holy Cross, an event held every year on January 19th. The accusation was presented as if Srdanović had somehow faked or exaggerated his role in this deeply respected religious and national tradition. Another student candidate, Emina Spahić, who comes from Novi Pazar, a city in Serbia with a majority Muslim population, was falsely accused of refusing to wear a t-shirt with Cyrillic lettering. That accusation was clearly intended to make her seem disloyal to Serbian national symbols. Yet another student, Emilija Milenković, was the target of a fabricated story that she had revealed the “true” policy and program of the student movement, including a claim that the movement would declare Serbs a “genocidal” people. Each of these stories shares a common goal: to delegitimize the student list by questioning the identity, loyalty, and moral character of its candidates. It is a classic and effective strategy, using fear and suspicion to turn voters against people they might otherwise see as honest and promising.
The second most common topic in the disinformation campaign concerns the program and candidates of the student list itself. Here, the manipulators tried a slightly different approach. Instead of offering a serious critique of the policies and proposals that the student list has actually presented, they invented a program for the list and then attacked that invention as if it were real. This is a particularly sneaky form of manipulation, because it avoids engaging with the real issues and instead replaces the debate with a fictional version of the opponent. One analyst, Uroš Piper, went so far as to invent what he called the “five real points” of the student list program. Among these fabricated points was the absurd claim that the students wanted to kick the children of every member of the ruling Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) out of kindergarten. That story was designed to make the student list seem extreme and vindictive, while also appealing to parents and families who might react emotionally to the idea of children being hurt. Tabloids also tried to portray the students as inconsistent and dishonest by claiming that they had proudly insisted their list would include only students, and that this promise had been broken. In reality, the student list may have evolved or included other figures, but the claim that the students had made an absolute and exclusive promise was itself untrue. Even the country’s top political figure, Aleksandar Vučić, got involved in this pattern of misrepresentation. He claimed that there were “no workers, peasants, or students” on the list, a statement that is demonstrably false. The underlying purpose of this theme is to create a negative impression of the student list as disorganized, dishonest, and out of touch with ordinary people. By attacking the program and the candidates with invented details, the manipulators hoped to undermine the credibility of the entire movement and reduce its appeal to voters.
Not all disinformation, however, centered on the student list. The topic of election procedures was the exception, and it is arguably the most dangerous category because it directly attacks voters’ understanding of the electoral process. In this theme, the disinformation aimed to create confusion and suspicion about how the election works, what the rules are, and how votes are counted. For example, manipulative illustrations circulated on social networks that encouraged supporters of the ruling SNS and its coalition partner SPS to circle the numbers in front of both ruling parties’ lists on the ballot. This would seem like a harmless act of support, but in reality, marking two lists instead of one would make the ballot invalid. The illustrations were therefore an attempt to trick loyal voters into accidentally spoiling their own votes. Another case involved Sofija Mandić, a lawyer and member of the Republic Election Commission (RIK). Tabloids falsely described her as a representative of the student list in that body, which was incorrect. Then, based on that false premise, they tried to delegitimize her by dredging up a position she had taken on Kosovo and Metohija seven years earlier. This is a common technique: first invent or exaggerate a connection, then attack the person for views that may have nothing to do with their current role. In another case, a member of the RIK claimed that objections to the use of Aleksandar Vučić’s name in the name of the SNS-led list contained no references to laws or the constitution. That claim also turned out to be false. Such misinformation can be extremely harmful, because it makes voters distrust the electoral system itself. If people believe the rules are confusing, unfair, or easily manipulated, they may lose confidence in the legitimacy of the entire election, and that erosion of trust is difficult to repair. The economy was another theme that drew disinformation, often in the form of incorrect economic data or selective quoting of people who had spoken about economic matters. Some of these manipulations were designed to paint a rosier picture of the current economy by comparing it to an imagined “economic chaos” of the past. For example, Aleksandar Vučić, in an address marking his departure from the office of president, cited incorrect figures about public debt and unemployment rates from the period before his party came to power. Tabloids also misquoted the student list’s Ilija Srdanović, claiming he had said the controversial Expo project was not so bad, when in fact he had said something different. Elsewhere, professor Miodrag Zec was selectively quoted to support a tabloid narrative that the student rebellion was really a “rebellion of the rich,” a framing intended to appeal to class resentment and undermine the students’ credibility as genuine voices of the people.
Another recurring pattern in the disinformation was the attempt to create the impression of conflicts, fractures, and in-fighting within the opposition, especially around the student movement. Unsubstantiated news about tensions among opposition groups appears almost regularly in tabloids, but the fact-checkers were able to identify only two such stories as clear disinformation. In the first, it was falsely claimed that the student movement had published a video parody directed at the university rector, Vladan Đokić, after it had become clear that he was not going to be a candidate on the student list. This story was meant to make the students look petty, disrespectful, and divided. The second involved judge Miodrag Majić, a figure known for being critical of the authorities. The claim was that Majić had criticized Ilija Srdanović, the first candidate on the student list. In reality, the news was based on a post on X that had nothing to do with Srdanović, as Majić later confirmed in subsequent posts. By inventing or exaggerating these internal disputes, the manipulators sought to present the student list and its allies as a disorganized and quarrelsome group, incapable of unity and unworthy of trust. This technique is especially effective in a political context where unity is valued and where voters are often looking for strong, cohesive leadership. The manipulation techniques behind these cases deserve close attention. The two most common methods were quote twisting and false attribution. Quote twisting involves taking a person’s actual words and selectively editing, misquoting, or paraphrasing them in a way that changes their meaning. In one egregious example, the tabloid Alo completely invented a direct quote from the former athlete and current opposition activist Vladimir Štimac, putting words in his mouth that he never said. The fabricated quote, which was highly vulgar and aggressive, was used in a headline to make him appear violent and unhinged. False attribution is similar, but instead of twisting a real quote, it assigns entirely false actions, beliefs, or roles to a person or group. The students were falsely attributed with having posted a parody about the rector, with waving and smiling at a Croatian Member of the European Parliament in a way that was meant to seem traitorous, and with having a program that included kicking children out of kindergarten. Some of the disinformation also fell into the category of statistical manipulation, where data or research was deliberately misrepresented to support a false narrative. The remaining cases were harder to classify and were placed into a general “Other” category, but they still contributed to the overall climate of confusion and distrust.
The picture that emerges from these first three weeks is a sobering one. The election campaign in Serbia is being fought not only on the ground and in rallies, but also in the information space, where manipulation is widespread and often highly organized. The fact-checkers at FakeNews Tragač stress that their analysis covers only the cases they were able to identify and verify, not the total number of falsehoods that actually appeared. The true scale of disinformation is almost certainly greater, and it is likely to intensify as the election draws closer. Still, the patterns are clear. The student list is a primary target, attacked through national identity issues, fabricated programs, and invented conflicts. Election procedures are being distorted in ways that could directly harm voters. Economic claims are being used to rewrite history and create favorable comparisons that do not hold up to scrutiny. And the techniques of quote twisting, false attribution, and statistical manipulation are being deployed with increasing sophistication. For voters, this means that caution is essential. Every striking headline, every shocking quote, every dramatic claim should be questioned. The work of fact-checkers is more important than ever, but it cannot succeed without an audience that is willing to stop, think, and verify before believing. FakeNews Tragač has promised to continue tracking pre-election disinformation, publishing updates in its Brief and Analysis sections, and will return in three weeks with another overview using the same categories. In the meantime, they point readers to the work of their colleagues at Raskrikavanje and Istinomer for a more complete picture of the campaign. In a democracy, elections are supposed to be a time for honest debate and informed choices. That ideal is only possible if citizens are able to recognize manipulation and demand better from those who seek to lead them.