The clock is ticking toward Nigeria’s 2027 general election, and those tasked with safeguarding the democratic process are sounding an alarm that sounds less like a routine warning and more like a call to arms. The chairman of the Independent National Electoral Commission, Professor Joash Ojo Amupitan, stood before a room full of journalists, policymakers, and civil society groups in Abuja and laid out a troubling new reality: the most dangerous threats to elections are no longer just stolen ballot boxes, thuggery at polling units, or manual tampering with results. Instead, the battle for credibility is increasingly being fought in the digital space, through artificial intelligence, deepfakes, manipulated videos, cloned voices, and fabricated images that can spread across social media in seconds. Speaking at the opening of a two-day summit in the capital, titled “Beyond the Ballot: National Summit on Electoral Information Integrity,” Amupitan warned that these emerging technologies have created new vulnerabilities that could shake public trust in democratic institutions at their very foundation. The summit, convened by the International Press Centre, the Centre for Media and Society, and Development Alternatives Incorporated under the European Union Support to Democratic Governance in Nigeria programme, brought together a broad coalition of stakeholders for a serious conversation about protecting the information environment around the 2027 election. The chairman’s message was direct: the risks are real, they are growing, and if stakeholders do not take them seriously now, the consequences could be devastating for Nigeria’s democracy.
Amupitan took care to sketch out just how sophisticated these threats have become, explaining that the weaponisation of information has evolved well beyond old-fashioned propaganda or rumour-mongering. Today, synthetic media can make it appear that a political candidate said something they never said, or that a public official committed an act they never committed. Voice cloning can produce convincing audio of a leader calling for violence or making inflammatory statements. Automated networks and coordinated online campaigns can flood social media with false narratives, drown out credible sources, and create the illusion of widespread public opinion where none exists. These tools, the INEC chairman warned, could be used to mislead voters, damage reputations, incite ethnic or religious tensions, and cast doubt on the integrity of legitimate electoral outcomes. The danger, he emphasised, is not limited to a single moment in the electoral calendar. Rather, the risks could emerge at different stages of the electoral cycle: during voter registration, throughout political campaigns, on voting day itself, when results are being announced, and even afterward, during post-election dispute resolution. In other words, there is no safe stretch of the road. Because of this, Amupitan stressed that protecting the credibility of the 2027 election will require far more than securing polling units and safely moving sensitive election materials. It will also require protecting the information environment where voters receive, interpret, and share electoral information. That means strengthening voter education and digital literacy, deploying technological safeguards that can identify and respond to misleading content, and developing mechanisms for quickly correcting false narratives before they take root in the public mind.
That point was reinforced by Dr Lanre Arogundade, Executive Director of the International Press Centre, who opened the floor to hard lessons from the 2023 general elections. Arogundade reminded the audience that Nigeria has already seen, firsthand, the damage that can be done when misinformation is allowed to spread unchecked. False claims, social media manipulation, and the growing use of artificial intelligence to distort electoral information were not abstract concerns in 2023; they were lived experiences that complicated the electoral process and challenged the capacity of institutions to maintain order and trust. What made those challenges even more difficult, he explained, was the lack of a coordinated, systemic response. Different actors often worked in silos, and by the time inaccurate information was corrected, it had already been shared tens of thousands of times. Arogundade argued that a different approach is necessary, one that brings all relevant stakeholders together to protect the integrity of electoral information without undermining fundamental rights. He called for the development of a national response protocol and stronger collaboration among institutions, and he pointed to the proposed Nigeria Electoral Information Integrity Partnership as an important platform for coordinated action. The goal, as he framed it, is not to shut down debate or restrict free expression, but to build a resilient system where factual, verifiable information can thrive and where citizens are equipped to tell truth from far-fetched falsehoods. The summit was designed, in part, to lay the groundwork for that kind of cooperation.
Adding a practical dimension to the discussion, former INEC Chairman Professor Attahiru Jega offered an idea that captured the spirit of the moment: technology can be used to fight technology. Rather than treating AI and digital tools as purely hostile forces, Jega suggested that electoral authorities could deploy INEC-backed chatbots designed to provide citizens with verified electoral information and help them authenticate claims circulating online. Imagine a voter receiving a viral message claiming that polling stations have been moved, or that a candidate has withdrawn, or that election results have already been decided. Instead of relying on rumour or partisan commentary, that voter could quickly check the information through a trusted, official chatbot and get a clear, verified answer. Jega stressed that access to credible information is essential if voters are to distinguish between genuine electoral updates and fabricated claims. His proposal was not offered as a magic bullet, but as part of a broader set of tools and strategies that could help shore up public confidence. It also underscored a larger theme of the summit: that the fight against disinformation is not just about blocking bad content, but about actively providing good content that people can rely on. The former INEC chairman’s words resonated with many participants, because they suggested a proactive, innovative approach rather than a purely defensive one. If institutions can meet citizens where they are, on the platforms they already use, with accurate and timely information, they stand a better chance of shaping the narrative before it is hijacked by bad actors.
The European Union’s Ambassador to Nigeria and ECOWAS, Gautier Mignot, then delivered a sobering reminder of what is ultimately at stake. Information manipulation, he warned, is fundamentally an attack on public trust. When citizens cannot agree on basic facts, when they doubt official statements, and when they believe that elections are rigged regardless of evidence, the social fabric begins to fray. Mignot stressed that preparations to tackle electoral disinformation must begin well before election-related tensions intensify. Too often, responses are reactive, waiting until false narratives have already gone viral and poisoned the public conversation. By then, it may be too late. He called for stronger operational partnerships among relevant stakeholders, but he also insisted that these efforts must be grounded in respect for fundamental rights, including press independence and citizens’ participation in the democratic process. The ambassador also made a point that is sometimes overlooked: responses to information manipulation must be inclusive. Women, citizens who rely on local languages, and those who face barriers to accessing digital information are often left out of these conversations, even though they are among the most vulnerable to disinformation. Mignot reaffirmed the European Union’s support for Nigerian-led efforts to strengthen electoral integrity, making clear that the objective is not to influence the outcome of any election, but to support the democratic process itself. His words served as both a warning and a reassurance: the international community is paying attention, but the primary responsibility lies with Nigerian institutions and citizens.
The summit itself was designed to move beyond speeches and declarations. One of its key components was a simulation of an AI-driven electoral disinformation crisis, a practical exercise intended to test stakeholders’ preparedness and coordination in responding to information threats that could arise before, during, and after the 2027 elections. This simulation was not a theatrical performance; it was a stress test, pushing participants to think through difficult scenarios under pressure. The organisers said the summit aimed to facilitate the development of a rights-respecting, multi-stakeholder national response protocol to address electoral information threats. They also hoped to strengthen collaboration among relevant institutions and promote measures that protect electoral integrity while upholding freedom of expression, media freedom, and citizens’ right to information. As Nigeria prepares for another general election, the growing sophistication of digital manipulation has placed renewed attention on the ability of electoral institutions and other stakeholders to protect voters from misleading information and preserve confidence in the democratic process. There is no denying the scale of the challenge. But the conversations in Abuja suggested a growing recognition that silence and inaction are not options. The 2027 election will be won or lost not only at the ballot box, but also in the minds of voters, and protecting that space is now one of the most urgent tasks facing Nigeria’s democracy.