Manipur has become a place where the word “conflict” is no longer enough to capture the pain. What began as an eruption of violence between the Meitei and Kuki communities in May 2023 has since widened into a more tangled, more dangerous landscape. In the midst of this, a new layer of political and ethnic tension is being laid down, one that involves armed groups, peace talks, and the fragile trust between communities that have long lived side by side in the hill districts. The Kuki National Organisation, or KNO, an umbrella body that represents a number of armed Kuki organisations currently engaged in peace negotiations with the central government, has now stepped forward to challenge a narrative it believes is both false and dangerous. Speaking to reporters in the national capital, the KNO’s spokesperson, Dr Sailen Haokip, made it clear that the ongoing unrest in Manipur is not a Naga-Kuki conflict. That description, he argued, was being invented by the National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Isak-Muivah, better known as the NSCN-IM. The KNO’s allegation is pointed: the NSCN-IM, one of the most influential Naga insurgent groups, is trying to divert attention from its own internal troubles by reshaping the public understanding of the Manipur conflict. The fear is that if this false narrative takes root, it could push two communities into a confrontation that does not currently exist, and that, once ignited, may be very difficult to control.
Dr Haokip’s remarks were not made in isolation. They came in response to a question about the recent involvement of the Naga community in what has largely been described as a Meitei-Kuki conflict. Over the past few months, the violence in Manipur has shifted and expanded, with clashes between sections of the Naga and Kuki communities becoming increasingly frequent. This is a worrying development in itself, because the hilly regions of Manipur are home to both communities, often in neighbouring villages, sharing roads, markets, and daily life. The KNO spokesperson was careful to place this in historical perspective. He referred to the clashes between Naga and Kuki communities in the 1990s, when violence spread across several hill districts and left a deep imprint on collective memory. But he was equally careful to say that the current situation is not the same. In his view, the communities living in the hills today are far more aware of the consequences of violence. They have seen what happens when ethnic conflicts are allowed to spiral, and they have learned from that history. This awareness, he suggested, is exactly why the NSCN-IM’s alleged attempts to recreate the 1990s atmosphere are so concerning. By reviving old tensions and dressing them in new political language, the NSCN-IM is not merely misreading the moment; it is, in the KNO’s eyes, actively trying to manufacture a conflict that ordinary people do not want.
The warning issued by the KNO was not directed only at the NSCN-IM. It was also a direct appeal to the central government to step in before the situation worsens. Dr Haokip urged the Centre to intervene and deal with the Naga insurgent group, not through vague calls for restraint, but through concrete action that would prevent further escalation. He warned that if the NSCN-IM is allowed to continue its efforts unchecked, the result could be a growing animosity between the Kuki and Naga communities. That animosity, he stressed, does not exist at present. But it could be created, engineered, and then exploited by those who stand to benefit from chaos. The NSCN-IM, for its part, has a long and complicated history with the Indian state. It signed a ceasefire agreement with the central government in 1997, a move that was seen at the time as a major step toward negotiating a political solution to long-standing Naga demands. In 2015, that process was given a new framework when the group signed a framework agreement with the government, promising to find a political settlement within the constitutional structure. Yet, despite decades of talks, the deeper issues remain unresolved, and the group has faced internal challenges, factional pressures, and a constant need to maintain political relevance. The KNO’s accusation suggests that the NSCN-IM is now looking outward, to Manipur’s hills, as a way to regain the support base and momentum it fears it is losing. If true, that is not just a geopolitical calculation; it is a decision that could cost lives.
The concerns raised by the KNO were echoed, from a different angle, by another Kuki umbrella organisation, the United People’s Front, or UPF. This group represents armed Kuki outfits that have signed the Suspension of Operations agreement, or SoO, with the central government. These agreements have long been a mechanism to keep a fragile peace in the region, with camps where armed cadres are confined, monitored, and expected to adhere to a set of mutually agreed ground rules. The UPF’s spokesperson, Aron Kipgen, came forward with a serious allegation of his own. According to Kipgen, the recently deployed CoBRA battalions of the Central Reserve Police Force in Manipur have been targeting camps belonging to Kuki outfits that are covered by the SoO agreement. CoBRA, which is an elite counter-insurgency unit, is known for its specialised operations in hostile terrain. The deployment of such a unit in Manipur is part of the government’s effort to tighten control in the region, but for the UPF, its actions are seen as a unilateral violation of trust. Kipgen was blunt in his criticism of the raids on SoO camps, saying they had been carried out without any real provocation. The ground rules, he reminded reporters, require coordination with the local police and respect for the terms of the agreement. When those rules are ignored, the entire framework of the peace process begins to feel hollow.
Taken together, the statements from the KNO and the UPF paint a troubling picture of where Manipur is heading. This is not simply a story of two communities fighting each other; it is a story of many actors, each with their own histories, grievances, and ambitions. The conflict that began between the Meitei and Kuki communities has already claimed lives, displaced thousands, and shattered a sense of security in villages and towns that had managed to avoid the worst of the violence. The recent expansion into Naga-Kuki clashes adds another layer of complexity, because it threatens to drag in communities that have their own unresolved political aspirations. The Naga struggle, led by groups like the NSCN-IM, is not new, and it carries with it decades of emotion, memory, and sacrifice. But when that long-running struggle is used as a tool to reshape an unrelated conflict, the consequences can be devastating for ordinary people who just want to live in peace. The warning from the KNO is therefore a warning about the fragility of relationships that have held, despite earlier wounds. The hill communities are not naive; they remember the violence of the 1990s, they understand the signs, and they know when outside forces are trying to push them into a corner. What they are asking for, through their representatives, is that the Centre not allow the situation to be manipulated by those who have no stake in the peace of Manipur.
At its heart, the message from both the KNO and the UPF is a request for fairness and consistency. If armed groups are to be kept in camps under the SoO agreement, then those camps must be respected. If peace talks are to continue, then the language used around those talks cannot include false narratives that turn neighbours into enemies. If the central government deploys forces to restore order, those forces must act within the rules, not as the armed wing of one political view or another. The people of Manipur’s hills, the KNO and UPF seem to be saying, have already paid a heavy price for political games. They do not want to pay again. The NSCN-IM, for its part, has not responded to these allegations in the statements provided, and its own history and grievances remain an important part of the larger picture. But the plea from the Kuki leaders is not merely an accusation against a rival group; it is a call for the Centre to step in with a clearer, more honest approach. The central government has the power to convene conversations, to enforce ground rules, and to make sure that no group feels that peace is only for the powerful. What it cannot do is ignore the signs of a new crisis. In the hills of Manipur, the memories of 1990s violence are still sharp, and the warnings being issued today come from people who have seen too much to speak casually. They are not looking for war; they are looking for the centre of the table, for their voices to be heard, and for the rules of engagement to be honoured by everyone. Whether the Centre listens, and whether the NSCN-IM chooses to abandon the path of engineered confrontation, will determine whether Manipur can be pulled back from the edge or pushed further into a conflict that no one can control.

