This research examines Jordan’s 2023 Cybercrime Law, specifically its criminalization of “fake news,” and evaluates it against international human rights standards. While the global information landscape has been upended by social media, many nations are shifting toward the “securitization” of digital discourse. In Jordan, where over 80% of the population uses social media, the 2023 Law represents an aggressive effort by the state to consolidate control over the national narrative. This study argues that the law functions as a form of “networked authoritarianism,” where the government uses legalistic language to suppress dissent, effectively permanentizing emergency-style information controls under the guise of public safety.
At the heart of the research is a theoretical analysis of how states interpret “digital sovereignty.” While European models—such as the Digital Services Act—focus on protecting citizen data and holding tech platforms accountable, the Jordanian model adopts a state-centric approach. Here, digital sovereignty is interpreted as the state’s absolute right to control its information space. By applying securitization theory, the study demonstrates that the Jordanian government successfully frames digital disinformation not just as a nuisance, but as an existential threat to national security. This framing allows the state to bypass established norms of free expression, utilizing vague legal definitions to categorize political criticism as “fake news,” thereby justifying the use of criminal sanctions against ordinary citizens.
Using a rigorous qualitative design, the researchers conducted a doctrinal analysis of the 2023 Law, specifically Articles 15 and 21. These provisions lack the precise, narrow definitions required by international law, such as Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). The study contrasts Jordan’s approach with peers and benchmarks, including Tunisia, Germany, and the European Union. Unlike these models, which often prioritize tiered sanctions or platform accountability, the Jordanian framework relies on the direct criminalization of users. Case law, most notably the Jordanian Court of Cassation Decision No. 6280/2022, serves as a poignant example of this, where an individual was prosecuted for posting verified corruption allegations, confirming that the law’s ambiguity is being used as a tool to silence legitimate public discourse.
The research highlights a fundamental tension between Jordan’s legislative evolution and its international obligations. Under the ICCPR, any restriction on speech must be “provided by law,” “necessary,” and “proportionate.” The 2023 Law fails these tests by failing to distinguish between malicious falsehoods and satire, opinion, or investigative journalism. The study emphasizes that by failing to include a “public interest defense,” the law creates a widespread chilling effect—an observation supported by a reported 40% decline in critical online reporting in Jordan post-enactment. This shift moves law away from being a neutral arbiter of justice and turns it into an instrument for maintaining regime resilience.
To reconcile these security objectives with human rights standards, the authors propose a comprehensive reform agenda. They argue that the Jordanian government should move away from a purely punitive model—characterized by harsh prison sentences and excessive fines—toward a system built on procedural justice. This includes implementing independent judicial oversight for prosecutions, requiring the state to prove malicious intent, and incorporating explicit protections for whistleblowers and journalists. Furthermore, the authors recommend that the state pivot from user criminalization to a co-regulatory model, where platforms operate with transparency and the public is empowered through national media literacy initiatives designed to bolster resilience against disinformation from the bottom up.
Ultimately, the study positions Jordan’s legislative trajectory as a case of “Coordinated Digital Governance,” providing a nuanced understanding of how hybrid regimes negotiate global norms with internal security pressures. The authors conclude that the most sustainable defense against “information disorder” is not the restriction of digital speech, but the strengthening of the rule of law. By refining these legal definitions and prioritizing procedural safeguards, Jordan could satisfy its legitimate security concerns without eroding the democratic foundations of online debate. The research serves as a vital template for understanding the future of digital rights in the Global South, where the struggle for truth is increasingly framed within the cold logic of state power.