For decades, the narrative that Nigeria’s 1999 Constitution was a “military decree” imposed upon the people has dominated our national discourse. However, in his newly released autobiography, Call of Duty, former Head of State General Abdulsalami Abubakar (retd.) has stepped forward to challenge this perception, offering a deeply personal and historical account of how the document actually came to be. Celebrating his 84th birthday, the retired General clarified that he was not the architect of an enforced military document, but rather a steward who listened to the collective voice of Nigerians during a volatile transition period. He asserts that the document, far from being written by soldiers in a backroom, is fundamentally a civilian product rooted in the legacy of the 1979 Constitution.
The heart of General Abdulsalami’s defense lies in the origins of the legal framework he oversaw. He explains that when he took office, his primary objective was to facilitate a swift and peaceful return to democracy. To handle the constitutional question, he established the Constitution Debate Coordinating Committee (CDCC) under the leadership of the late Justice Niki Tobi. Contrary to the belief that this committee was tasked with writing a new law, their actual mandate was to gather public sentiment regarding the defunct 1995 draft associated with the late General Sani Abacha. Upon receiving 405 memoranda from Nigerians at home and abroad, the committee found an overwhelming rejection of the Abacha-era draft. Instead, the people demanded a return to the 1979 Constitution—a document famously drafted by 49 distinguished civilian legal experts under General Murtala Muhammed.
What makes this human story particularly striking is the General’s candid reflection on the political pressure of 1998 and 1999. He admits that reverting to the 1979 document was not his initial plan, but the consensus among Nigerians was too significant to ignore. He realized that pushing forward with the controversial 1995 draft would have ignited fierce resistance from groups like NADECO and Afenifere, likely jeopardizing the entire transition to civilian rule. By choosing to embrace the 1979 blueprint—which had already been thoroughly debated and vetted by a 230-member Constituent Assembly during the Second Republic—Abdulsalami ensured that the Fourth Republic started on a foundation that had at least enjoyed prior widespread civilian legitimacy.
General Abdulsalami also expresses a sense of irony regarding the criticism currently leveled against the 1999 Constitution. He points out that many of the political figures today who vehemently disparage the document are the very individuals who participated in the 1979 constitutional debates and rose to prominence under that same framework. He highlights that the 1979 process, led by the likes of the late Chief F.R.A. Williams, was a masterful exercise in intellectual rigor, involving a clause-by-clause review where only 20 of over 200 assembly members were government appointees. To him, the suggestion that these high-level civilian efforts were merely “military impositions” is a fundamental distortion of Nigeria’s judicial history.
Addressing the technical and symbolic criticisms—such as the inclusion of the Land Use Act or the absence of a national referendum—the former Head of State adopts a pragmatic, “living document” perspective. He notes that perfect constitutions do not exist; even the American Constitution, often held as the gold standard, has evolved through centuries of amendments. He maintains that his role was to provide a stable launching pad for democracy, and he reminds critics that his administration did introduce critical reforms, such as the 13 per cent derivation principle to address the cries of the Niger Delta. In his view, the 1999 Constitution was never meant to be a static, flawless relic, but a starting point for a nation that would continue to refine its laws through democratic discourse.
Ultimately, Abdulsalami’s account serves as a bridge between the military transition era and the modern day, inviting us to see the constitution not as a weapon of war, but as a product of compromise. He argues that by building on the 1979 model, he chose the path of least resistance and greatest stability, preventing a potential political collapse. While the debate over the document will surely continue, the former leader’s testimony emphasizes a vital lesson for the next generation: constitutional development is an iterative, human process. Rather than constantly debating the legitimacy of the source, he suggests that Nigerians should focus their energy on the ongoing, active task of amending and improving the document to suit the evolving needs of the country.