There is a story spreading across social media right now, and it is easy to see why so many people want to believe it. It goes something like this: after Ukrainian strikes on several Russian data centres belonging to Yandex, the country’s biggest tech company, the online propaganda machine that has helped fuel pro-Russian and far-right political movements across Europe suddenly went quiet. Disinformation about the war, the story claims, dropped significantly. Engagement generated by Russian bots and propagandists on platforms like X, TikTok and Facebook supposedly declined in a dramatic, visible way. The narrative has been amplified by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, and it has also been supported by politicians from a number of European countries, including representatives of the Polish government. The appeal is obvious. If this story is true, it would provide something rare and precious: hard, tangible evidence that the popularity of extremist, anti-European Union and pro-Russian political forces is not organically growing, but is being artificially inflated by manipulative operations directed from Moscow. It would also suggest that Ukraine, by striking at the infrastructure behind those operations, has dealt a blow not just to Russian military capabilities but to the information warfare machine that has poisoned democratic debate across the continent. No wonder the story has taken on a life of its own.
But is it true? As of 13 October, the picture is much less clear than the viral narrative suggests, and a growing number of experts and observers are urging caution before anyone pops the champagne. Some of the initial claims have already fallen apart under scrutiny. For instance, a widely shared chart that appeared to show bot traffic associated with the German far-right party AfD falling by 56 percent was later revealed to be AI-generated. It was not real data; it was a convincingly packaged piece of digital fiction. Other analysts who track Russian bot networks have said that, in their monitoring, they saw no significant fluctuations in the period after the strikes. At the same time, however, many ordinary social media users have reported that they noticed something different in their daily feeds, particularly on X. They describe a change in the atmosphere: fewer obviously coordinated replies, less inflammatory content, a strange calm where there would normally be a storm. The sheer number of people saying this means the story cannot simply be dismissed as a pro-Ukrainian and anti-Russian propaganda success, nor can it be written off as collective autosuggestion. Something may well have happened. The problem is that nobody seems to be able to prove exactly what, how much, and why.
This is where the European Digital Media Observatory, or EDMO, comes in. We are a network that connects fact-checkers, academics and media organisations across Europe, and our job is to help make sense of exactly these kinds of information crises. As the Yandex story began to circulate, we decided to test it against the real-world observations of people who spend every day monitoring the information space. We contacted a number of fact-checking organisations in our network and asked them a straightforward question: based on your monitoring of your country’s online information environment, have you noticed anything unusual? Do you have evidence that confirms or disproves the story? The responses we received were varied, and that variety is itself a warning against simplistic conclusions. Some organisations told us that they had indeed observed sudden changes in activity patterns on different platforms. One notable example: a sudden drop in engagement on TikTok for political hashtags typically associated with far-right and pro-Russian forces. That is exactly the kind of development that would seem to support the viral narrative. But other organisations, even when their monitoring also revealed significant shifts in behavioural dynamics, were more careful. They said that while they had seen changes, it was impossible to determine their cause. The strikes on Yandex may have contributed, they explained, but there are other possible explanations as well, ranging from algorithm changes to coordinated campaigns moving to other platforms or simply lying low for a while. And still others reported that they had recorded no decrease in the activity of pro-Russian accounts at all. In other words, the evidence from across Europe is not clean. It is messy, fragmented and contradictory.
What should we make of all this? The most honest answer is that, at this stage, there is no conclusive evidence that the strikes on Yandex data centres have led to a significant decrease in the activity of accounts linked to Russian propaganda and disinformation. That is the cautious, professional verdict, and it matters even though it feels unsatisfying. We live in a world where people want clear answers, especially when the question is about something as serious as the integrity of democratic elections and public debate. But wanting something to be true does not make it true, and the speed of online narratives often runs far ahead of the evidence. The fact that a story resonates emotionally, or that it fits our political preferences, does not mean it is reliable. The original claim was always going to be difficult to verify, for many reasons. The event it refers to happened very recently, and independent researchers do not have full access to the internal data of major platforms. Furthermore, disinformation networks are not static. They adapt, they retreat, they change their tactics, and they often try to avoid detection. A sudden drop in activity might mean that an operation has been disrupted, but it might also mean that it has simply changed its methods or moved to less visible corners of the internet. This is why professional fact-checkers and disinformation researchers are trained to resist the urge to draw big conclusions from limited data, especially when the story in question flatters our own worldview.
We are not saying that the Ukrainian strikes had no effect. We are saying that, so far, no publicly available evidence is strong enough to support the bold claims being made. And if there is better evidence out there, it should be made public. If national or European agencies possess data that conclusively demonstrate the validity of this story, as some public statements would appear to suggest, then we at EDMO would strongly encourage them to release that data so that independent, professional organisations working to counter disinformation can verify it and use it in their own work. This is not an unreasonable demand; it is how trust is built in a democracy. Without independent verification, there is a serious risk that statements made by European and national political institutions might be shaped by their own agendas rather than by solid evidence. Governments, after all, are not neutral actors in this conflict. They have every reason to highlight any development that weakens the Russian narrative, just as Russia has every reason to downplay or obscure such developments. That is why the role of independent fact-checkers and researchers is so important. We are not here to cheerlead. We are here to check, to question, to verify and to inform the public as clearly and honestly as we can.
At EDMO, we are still receiving assessments from organisations in our network, and we will continue to monitor the situation, request data and evidence, and update the public as soon as we have a clearer picture. Until then, we believe it is important to urge caution. The story about Yandex and the disappearing Russian bots is powerful, and it may turn out to be partly or even largely true. New evidence could emerge tomorrow that changes our current assessment. But as of today, the rational position is one of healthy scepticism. We should not allow confirmation bias to override our judgement, no matter how much we might want the story to be real. In the fight against disinformation, the greatest danger is not just falling for Russian lies; it is falling for our own wishes and mistaking them for facts. The information war is not a simple story of good versus evil, and the battlefield is cluttered with half-truths, manipulated images, false charts and genuine anomalies that are difficult to interpret. The best thing we can do, as citizens and as professionals, is slow down, demand evidence, and resist the urge to share stories simply because they make us feel hopeful or vindicated. In the end, the truth matters more than the headline, and the truth, in this case, is still unfolding.