Once a year, Germany gives its citizens a rare look into a world that is normally closed, dark, and invisible. It is a strange ritual of democracy: the heads of the country’s intelligence agencies, the men and women whose jobs depend on secrecy, sit in front of a public panel and answer questions. They do not talk about most of their operations, and they cannot reveal their sources. But they are expected to explain the broad threats facing the nation. This year, that explanation was more alarming than usual. In Berlin’s Bundestag, the Parliamentary Control Panel held its annual public hearing, and for a few hours the hidden world of German intelligence was briefly illuminated. Sitting at the table were Martin Jäger, president of the Federal Intelligence Service, known as the BND; Sinan Selen, president of the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, the BfV; and Martina Rosenberg, president of the Military Counterintelligence Service, the MAD. All three are normally available only in closed-door sessions, where the public cannot hear their words and the press cannot report their warnings. But once a year, they step into the light. This time, their message was not a routine update. It was a warning that Germany faces an increasingly aggressive campaign of sabotage, espionage, and psychological warfare, and that the old rules of intelligence work may no longer be enough to keep the country safe. The hearing was not designed to create panic. It was designed to prepare the public for difficult decisions ahead.
The central warning came from Martin Jäger, who said plainly that Russia currently poses the greatest threat to Germany. “Russia is waging a shadow war against us,” he told the committee. That phrase, “shadow war,” is not a dramatic metaphor. It describes a kind of conflict that exists below the threshold of open military combat. There are no official front lines, no soldiers in uniform crossing a border, and usually no declaration of war. Instead, the battle is fought in the gray areas of daily life. It involves cyberattacks on government networks and hospitals. It involves sabotage of infrastructure, such as railways, power lines, and ports. It involves disinformation campaigns designed to turn citizens against one another and to destroy trust in democratic institutions. It involves intimidation, whether against politicians, journalists, scientists, or ordinary people. And it can even involve murder. Jäger made clear that low-intensity actions against individual NATO member states are no longer rare exceptions. They have become the new normal. He also explained that Russia is trying especially hard to block arms shipments to Ukraine, using every available means short of a direct military attack. In this situation, he said, the intelligence services are “the first line of defense.” They are not just collectors of secrets anymore. They are the people who must recognize these shadow attacks before they produce a disaster, identify the perpetrators, and help stop them.
Sinan Selen, the head of Germany’s domestic intelligence service, offered concrete examples of what this shadow war looks like. Russia, he said, is demonstrating its willingness to engage in sabotage and murder. That is a chilling sentence, but it was not meant as a guess. Selen described a spectrum of hostile activities that includes disinformation, attempted attacks, and premeditated killings. One particularly vivid example came from Halle/Leipzig Airport in early August, where a drone rigged with explosives was discovered next to Ukrainian cargo planes. The drone was apparently ready to be used in an act of sabotage, and its discovery was a stark reminder that there is actually a physical dimension to this conflict, not just a digital one. A bomb could have been detonated. Cargo could have been destroyed. People could have been killed. Selen also said that German intelligence agencies have already achieved some successes in countering these threats. It would be wrong to say they are helpless. But he was careful not to offer too much comfort. The situation, he said, continues to worsen. He argued that German agencies must align their capabilities with those of other European partner services. This is a significant admission. It means that the German intelligence system, despite all its resources, still struggles to keep up with the pace and variety of Russian operations. Cooperation with allies is no longer just a polite diplomatic habit. It is a matter of survival.
The fact that these warnings were given in public is itself part of the story. The Parliamentary Control Panel normally operates behind closed doors. Committee members and intelligence chiefs meet privately because the work is too sensitive for public debate, and because revealing methods and sources would make the agencies less effective. But oversight cannot happen completely in the dark. That is why, once a year, the public hearing exists. It is a window into a world of secrets, and it is a reminder that even spies must answer to someone. The current session of the Bundestag has only lawmakers from the CDU/CSU, SPD, and Greens on the panel that oversees the intelligence agencies. Candidates from the AfD and the Left Party failed to win the necessary majorities in their respective elections. This is not a small procedural detail. It means that parties on both extremes, who often question the legitimacy of the intelligence services in very different ways, are not part of the oversight process. It also means that the annual public hearing is the only real chance for the wider public to see the intelligence chiefs being questioned by elected representatives who already know the secrets. This makes the event more important, but also more complicated. How can citizens evaluate a threat they cannot fully see? How can they trust a system that must hide so much? The hearing is an imperfect answer to those questions, but it is still an answer. It reminds everyone that intelligence agencies are not an independent empire. They are instruments of the state, and the state is ultimately accountable to the people.
These warnings come at a time when the German government is trying to change the legal rules under which its intelligence services operate. The Bundestag has not yet debated a bill proposed by the federal government that would expand the powers of the BfV and the BND. The reform is significant. In the past, German intelligence services were primarily seen as collectors of information. Their job was to observe, analyze, and report. They were not supposed to act like soldiers, police officers, or hackers. But the new proposal would change that. In certain cases, the agencies would be allowed to carry out operational tasks. For example, they might actively intervene to stop a cyberattack. Instead of merely warning the government that Russian hackers are inside a network, they could break into the attackers’ systems and disrupt their operations. They might even sabotage defense projects of foreign countries that threaten Germany’s security. This is a major departure from tradition. It goes to the heart of the debate about what a secret service in a democracy should be allowed to do. Hybrid attacks, as the intelligence chiefs explained, are a combination of military, economic, intelligence, and propaganda measures aimed at destabilizing other countries. They are hard to counter with ordinary laws because they happen in the gray areas between war and peace. The reform proposal is a response to that reality. But it also raises difficult civil liberties questions. If spies are allowed to launch cyberattacks, what stops them from using those powers against their own citizens? If they can sabotage foreign defense projects, who decides which projects are dangerous enough to justify such actions? The public hearing did not try to give easy answers. It only made clear that these questions can no longer be avoided.
In the end, the annual public hearing was both a warning and a request for trust. The intelligence chiefs asked for more powers, for more public understanding, and for stronger European cooperation. They spoke about a shadow war that is already underway, not one that might come someday. But their words also pointed to a deeper truth. A shadow war cannot be won by spies alone. It is fought in the minds of citizens as much as in the hidden networks of hackers and saboteurs. When disinformation spreads faster than truth, when a drone packed with explosives is found next to a cargo plane, when politicians are intimidated for doing their duty, the first line of defense is the intelligence services. The last line, however, is democratic resilience. Germany must invest in critical infrastructure, independent media, digital literacy, and social cohesion. These are not soft, optional goals. They are essential defenses against an adversary that hopes to weaken the country from within. The intelligence chiefs are right to say that Russia poses the greatest threat to Germany. They are also right that Germany must become more resilient. But resilience cannot mean building a fortress that guards itself against the world. It must mean building a society strong enough to face danger without surrendering its principles. The annual public hearing is a small but powerful reminder that even in the hidden world of intelligence, democracy still requires accountability. It is not enough to know that a threat exists. The public must understand it, debate it, and decide how to respond. The hearing gave citizens a glimpse into that world. It also gave them a choice: to sleepwalk through the shadow war, or to take part in the defense of their own open society.