Not so long ago, the word “battlefield” almost automatically made people think of tanks, trenches, and soldiers in camouflage. But in Europe today, the most dangerous attacks are often invisible, taking place through fake news stories, manipulated videos, anonymous social media accounts, and carefully coordinated lies designed to turn friends against each other. Poland, one of the countries most exposed to this strange new war, has just made a very important decision. According to Polskie Radio, the Polish government has announced the creation of a specialised state Centre for Countering Disinformation, the first dedicated agency of its kind in Europe. This is not just another government office or a bureaucratic experiment. It is a direct response to an unprecedented escalation of hybrid attacks and subversive operations launched by the Russian Federation and Belarus, whose goal, according to Polish authorities, has been to destabilise the social and political situation in the country. The Polish government has watched these threats grow for years, but recent events have made it clear that the old, reactive approach—responding to disinformation after it has already spread—is no longer enough. The new Centre will be different. It will be a permanent, round-the-clock institution, always watching, always listening, and always ready to coordinate a defence when the information space is invaded. It will not replace intelligence services or independent media, but it will serve as a central hub for identifying harmful narratives, understanding where they come from, and working with other security agencies to limit their damage. The creation of this Centre is a powerful signal that Poland takes the threat of disinformation as seriously as it takes traditional military threats. In a way, it marks the beginning of a new security philosophy, one that recognises that words can be as dangerous as weapons, and that a country’s greatest strength lies not only in its army, but in the public trust that holds its institutions together.
What will the Centre actually do? The name gives the general idea, but the details matter even more. The new body will be responsible for round-the-clock monitoring of the information space, which means it will keep a constant watch on news websites, social media platforms, television channels, internet forums, and countless other digital channels where disinformation can spread. It will not be limited to passively collecting reports or counting suspicious posts. Its job is to identify harmful disinformation campaigns at an early stage, understand their origins, map their spread, and then coordinate the activities of Poland’s relevant security agencies. This is an incredibly difficult task, because modern disinformation is not like a single forged newspaper or a puzzling radio broadcast. It is a complex, ever-changing phenomenon that adapts to current events, exploits real emotions, and often hides behind half-truths rather than outright lies. A fake story about a missing soldier, a distorted video of a political leader, a manufactured quote from a trusted expert, a campaign that uses thousands of bot accounts to make one dangerous opinion seem popular—these are just a few examples of the kind of threats the Centre will have to confront every single day. To do this successfully, its specialists will use advanced big-data analysis and artificial intelligence technologies. These tools can detect patterns that are invisible to ordinary human readers, allowing analysts to spot bot farms, fake news websites, and coordinated attacks on social media before they become too dangerous. At the same time, the human factor remains essential. Artificial intelligence can help find the lie, but only people can truly understand the context, culture, history, and emotions that make a particular lie so dangerous in Poland. That is why the Centre will bring together not only technical experts, but also analysts, communications specialists, intelligence professionals, and scholars who can look at the broader picture and help explain what is happening to the public in a calm and credible way.
The Centre’s main task is not simply to debunk every false claim that appears online, which would be an endless and exhausting marathon. Rather, its central mission is to promptly neutralise false narratives that undermine citizens’ trust in state institutions, Warsaw’s defence policy, and Poland’s comprehensive assistance to Ukraine. These are the three main pillars of the Kremlin’s information warfare strategy against Poland, and they are closely interconnected. If you can make people stop trusting their government, then their society becomes weaker, their democracy becomes noisier, and their willingness to support long-term policies starts to crumble. If you can convince a nation that its own military is corrupt, incompetent, or preparing for reckless adventures, then you weaken that country’s ability to deter real enemies. And if you can spread hatred and suspicion toward Ukrainian refugees and the Ukrainian government, you can potentially split a vital alliance, reduce public support for humanitarian aid, and cause political chaos inside Poland. These are not abstract concerns. Every one of these narratives has been actively used in recent years, often with the help of thousands of bot accounts, dozens of fake news websites, and social media groups that appear to be spontaneously formed but are actually coordinated by foreign actors. The Centre will therefore focus on protecting those specific areas where trust is most important and where disinformation can do the most damage. This does not mean suppressing legitimate criticism or preventing Poles from debating politics. Free speech, including harsh criticism of the government, is a fundamental democratic right and must always be protected. What the Centre is designed to protect against is not opinion, but manipulation—the deliberate, hidden, and dishonest attempt to distort reality, poison public debate, and turn democratic institutions into objects of suspicion and hatred. That distinction is critical, and it will guide the Centre’s work every day.
No institution can succeed in this fight alone, and the Polish government knows that very well. That is why the new Centre will work closely with a wide range of partners, both at home and abroad. At the domestic level, it will cooperate with the intelligence services, which can provide classified information about foreign actors and their methods. It will also coordinate with the Ministry of Digital Affairs, which has responsibility for digital policy and cybersecurity, and with the Polish Armed Forces, which must protect not only the country’s borders but also its communication systems, defence infrastructure, and the morale of soldiers and their families. This kind of cooperation is not always easy in ordinary times, because intelligence agencies, government ministries, and military institutions often have different priorities, different cultures, and different rules about secrecy. But when a disinformation campaign is raging, there is no time for institutional jealousy or bureaucratic hesitation. The Centre’s role is to act as a kind of conductor, bringing different players together, making sure that they share information quickly, and helping them act as one unified team. That is an ambitious vision, and it will take time to build trust and efficient procedures. But it is essential, because disinformation does not respect administrative borders. A false narrative can begin with a single document leaked by an intelligence agency, then spread through a social media platform, then be amplified by a fake news website that looks like a real media outlet, then be repeated by a foreign politician, and finally end up in a Polish living room as a viral video shared by a concerned neighbour. The only way to fight this process is to build a network of defenders who can respond at every stage, from the secret intelligence report to the public fact-checking campaign.
The Polish government’s initiative reflects a growing recognition across Europe that hybrid information threats are not a temporary problem or a passing fashion. They are a permanent feature of modern geopolitics, and they require the creation of institutionalised protection systems at the national level. For a long time, many countries believed that disinformation was mainly a domestic nuisance, something that could be handled by social media companies, fact-checkers, and journalists. But the experience of recent years has shown that this optimistic approach is not enough. Hostile actors, especially the Russian Federation, have developed sophisticated structures, enormous budgets, and deep experience in manipulating information, and they are constantly looking for new ways to exploit open societies. Poland, because of its geography, its history, and its role in supporting Ukraine, has become a primary target. The authorities expect the Centre not only to strengthen Polish society’s resilience to Kremlin manipulation and information provocations, but also to serve as a model for other European countries facing aggressive propaganda and hostile interference in their internal affairs. In that sense, Poland is trying to do something more than protect itself. It wants to pioneer a model of democratic defence that can be used by other nations without undermining their openness or turning them into surveillance states. This is a difficult balance. On one hand, the protection of democratic institutions and public trust is essential. On the other hand, any measure that restricts information can be misused by governments to silence legitimate dissent. The Centre must therefore act with transparency, accountability, and respect for the law. It cannot work in complete secrecy, because that would make citizens suspicious of its motives. It must publish clear reports, explain its methods, and allow public scrutiny of its activities. Only by combining effectiveness with transparency can the Centre earn the trust of the very people it is trying to protect.
Looking ahead, the creation of the Centre for Countering Disinformation is a bold and necessary step, but it is not a magic solution. The battle for trust will not be won by a single institution, no matter how advanced its technology or how skilled its analysts. It will also have to be fought in schools, where young people need to learn how to think critically about media and information; in families, where parents need the confidence to talk with their children about what they see online; and in every citizen’s daily habits, because each time we pause before sharing a shocking headline, each time we check a source, and each time we ask ourselves whether a story is trying to inform us or manipulate us, we weaken the power of disinformation. This is the human side of the story, and it is just as important as the Centre’s algorithms, legal powers, and international partnerships. The Polish government has now built an important new shield, and that is genuinely good news for the security of Poland and Europe. But a shield can only block attacks; it cannot build a community that is strong, informed, and united. That task belongs to all of us. In the end, the Centre for Countering Disinformation is not simply an agency tasked with detecting lies. It is a reminder that the truth is not something we can take for granted. It must be defended, every day, with courage, wisdom, and patience. Poland has chosen to take on that responsibility in a concrete and serious way, and in doing so, it has shown other democracies what it means to fight for the truth without losing their soul.