It began quietly. In mid-October 2026, while other crises dominated the news, a group of Polish experts arrived in Canberra for a study visit that would not attract much attention. But in a world where disinformation is being used as a weapon, the visit was a reminder that some of the most important diplomacy happens far from the spotlight. The three-day visit, from 14 to 16 October 2026, brought together specialists from Poland’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, NASK – the Polish institution responsible for advanced digital research, including cyber security and modern information technologies – and two leading independent think tanks, the Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM) and the Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW). Their mission was simple to state but difficult to accomplish: to exchange knowledge with Australian counterparts about countering disinformation and other hybrid threats. What made this visit different from standard diplomatic consultations was the nature of the subject. Disinformation is not a conventional security challenge. It does not respect borders, and it often disguises itself as ordinary speech, making it hard to detect and even harder to fight. The Polish delegation did not come with heavy documents or official declarations. They came with experience gained in a region where the manipulation of information has become a constant feature of political life. That experience, as the next few days would show, was something Australia was very interested in hearing.
The central event of the trip was an international conference held on 16 October, with the thought-provoking title “The Battle for Truth: Countering Disinformation Across Europe and the Indo-Pacific.” The conference was co-organized by the Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Canberra and the Australian National University Centre for European Studies. It was an unusual combination: a diplomatic mission and a university research centre working side by side. But the partnership made sense, because disinformation cannot be understood by governments alone. It involves media systems, social psychology, digital platforms, civic education and the very way in which people form beliefs. The conference brought together experts from different countries and disciplines to talk about these issues in a frank and practical way. The title itself was a statement of purpose. It suggested that the search for truth is not merely an intellectual exercise, but a battle. It is a battle for attention, for trust, and for the ability of citizens to make decisions based on reality rather than manipulation. The conversations that day did not simply focus on the latest disinformation tactics, although that was important. They also focused on deeper questions: Why do lies spread faster than facts? How can public institutions respond without becoming heavy-handed? And how can democratic societies defend themselves while remaining open and free? These are not easy questions, and no single conference could answer them all. But to ask them together, across the Europe–Indo-Pacific axis, was a significant step.
The conference, however, did not stand alone. It was the centrepiece of a broader three-day programme that reflected the conviction that meetings on their own are not enough. The Polish delegation spent time with officials from Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, as well as other government agencies. These were the kind of working discussions that never appear in press releases but are necessary if cooperation is to become substantive. They allowed both sides to talk about mechanisms, lessons learned and possible fields of cooperation. Equally important were the informal interactions with media representatives, academics and members of the diplomatic corps in Canberra. In such settings, protocol recedes and sincerity becomes possible. People can exchange concerns, ask uncomfortable questions and begin to build the kind of personal relationships that are essential when dealing with hybrid threats. The programme also included dedicated thematic workshops. These were not lectures. They were practical sessions in which participants could examine specific cases, test different responses and consider the roles of institutions, civil society and ordinary citizens. This combination of formal meetings, quiet conversations and hands-on workshops showed that the Polish delegation was less interested in ceremony than in action. The goal was not to deliver a polished statement; it was to build a toolkit and a network. That approach is especially valuable in the area of disinformation, where the threat is ever-evolving and no one has all the answers.
Why Poland and Australia? At first glance, they may seem like strange partners. Poland is situated in the middle of Europe, deeply influenced by centuries of history and by its current position on the front line of the crisis caused by Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. Australia is located in the Indo-Pacific, distant from Europe and focused on its own region. But the two countries share a fundamental commitment to democratic values and open societies, and both have become increasingly concerned about the global implications of Russian disinformation and the broader problem of foreign interference. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has made the danger more visible. It is not only a conventional war; it is accompanied by a massive effort to manipulate information, undermine international support and weaken the democratic will. Poland, because of its proximity and history, is one of the countries most exposed to this tactic. Australians, in turn, live in a region where geopolitical competition is intensifying and where information warfare is no longer an abstract concept. The challenges are different in some ways, but the underlying threat is similar: a deliberate effort to confuse, divide, polarise and exhaust democratic societies. For both countries, the battle for truth has become connected to their national security. That realization was strongly reflected in the discussions in Canberra. The visit gave Polish experts an opportunity to explain how they see the threat and how they have tried to respond, while also listening carefully to Australian assessments of the Indo-Pacific. The point was not to copy somebody else’s model, but to understand common patterns and to develop better solutions together.
Perhaps the most valuable contribution of the Polish side was its practical experience. Poland has faced disinformation campaigns for years, not only those originating from Russia but also from other actors seeking to exploit divisions in European societies. These campaigns have been aimed at influencing public opinion, undermining confidence in the state, destabilizing the political process and weakening solidarity within the European Union and NATO. Dealing with them has required a combination of legal responses, media literacy programs, independent fact-checking, diplomatic action and coordination among institutions. The Polish delegation included representatives of organizations that are involved in this effort on a daily basis. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs works on the diplomatic and strategic dimensions of countering disinformation. NASK focuses on the technological aspect and on research that helps maintain the security of Poland’s digital space. PISM and OSW have long been engaged in analysing Russian policy and its hybrid tactics, helping to translate raw information into assessments that can guide policy. Together, the members of the delegation represented the whole spectrum of activities involved in the response to hybrid threats: analysis, policy, technology and public communication. During the workshops and meetings, they were able to share specific examples of how disinformation is produced, launched and amplified, and how it can be countered without sliding into censorship. They also stressed the importance of resilience: societies that are well informed and confident in their institutions are much harder to manipulate. This message clearly resonated with Australian participants, who are themselves working on strengthening democratic resilience in an increasingly contested region.
The main outcome of the visit was not a treaty or a formal agreement. It was something deeper: a shared understanding that like-minded countries must cooperate more closely and must actively support each other in the face of common threats. The Polish delegation emphasised that such cooperation should strengthen existing frameworks, particularly NATO and the European Union, but that those frameworks are not enough by themselves. The fight against disinformation requires flexible and creative partnerships that bring together governments, think tanks, media organisations, researchers and citizens. It also requires genuine readiness to learn from one another across regions. The Canberra visit proved that Poland and Australia can cooperate in this field despite the distance between them. In fact, the distance may be an advantage. Different perspectives make it possible to see the same problem from multiple angles. The discussions also highlighted the need to continue this process. Meetings and conferences are not the final destination; they are part of a longer journey. The Polish experts returned to Warsaw with new contacts and ideas, and Australian officials gained a clearer view of Europe’s experience with hybrid warfare. But the real winner, at the end of the day, is the idea of democratic resilience. In a time when the truth is under attack from many directions, the quiet, persistent work of building trust between friends and allies is more essential than ever. The battle for truth is not a battle to be won once, but a continuous effort to protect human dignity, freedom and the simple ability of people to decide for themselves based on facts. The visit of Polish experts to Canberra was a small but meaningful contribution to that effort.