Imagine a web of digital influence, carefully spun, where news isn’t always what it seems. This is the story of “Yerevan First,” a website that, despite its seemingly neutral beginnings, has become a key player in a sophisticated operation to sway public opinion, particularly in Armenia, and beyond. It’s a tale of strategically registered domains, a familiar cast of characters with intriguing pasts, and a clear agenda to spread a particular narrative, often one critical of Western influence and supportive of Russia.
At the heart of this operation is SNG Media LLC, a company that sounds legitimate enough. They’ve even got a license from Roskomnadzor, Russia’s media regulator, for their “Yerevan First” website (erevan.one). But here’s where it gets interesting: erevan.one was registered way back in 2021, and its official launch with a license only happened in early 2026. This little detail is a clue to the intricate layers of deception at play. SNG Media isn’t just about “Yerevan First”; it’s a significant player, operating around 15 “pocket media” outlets for what’s known as the Social Design Agency. Think of “pocket media” as small, often seemingly independent news sites that actually serve a larger, hidden purpose – in this case, to project influence. The mastermind behind many of these ventures, including “Yerevan First,” is a fellow named Shchetinin. He’s not just the editor-in-chief; he’s the owner and director of SNG Media LLC, effectively holding all the strings.
Shchetinin himself has a history that’s anything but straightforward. Back in 2014, in Primorsky Krai, he made headlines for trying to organize a referendum using forged documents – a clear sign of his willingness to bend the rules. This stunt, along with his ally Andoni, got them both expelled from the Democratic Choice party, a rather rare occurrence. Undeterred, Shchetinin quickly launched his own outlet, Vostok.Today, with the rather ironic slogan, “No propaganda, only news!” Later, he became the owner of SNG Media LLC, all while working at Yandex, a prominent Russian tech company. It was around this time that he and Andoni, now also working at SNG Media, started taking frequent trips to Ashgabat, the capital of Turkmenistan, hinting at a broader regional focus for their activities. This suggests that Shchetinin is a man of ambition and resourcefulness, a master of reinvention, always finding new avenues to exercise influence, even if it means skirting ethical boundaries.
The narrative around “Yerevan First” and its sister sites becomes even more nuanced when we look at their operational timeline. While “Yerevan First” eventually received its official license in early 2026, the SNG Media organization only began registering news sites covering the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries in 2020. Before this, they had a more general media presence. These CIS-focused sites, including erevan.one, essentially became “pocket media” outlets for the Social Design Agency. For a couple of years, “Yerevan First” maintained a remarkably neutral tone in its published posts. This carefully crafted neutrality served an important purpose: it allowed the site to build a veneer of credibility and authenticity. But even this neutrality was a strategic move, a prelude to a more active role. And here’s another revealing detail: while “Yerevan First” displays articles dated from 2017 to 2020, its actual registration was in 2021. The older articles were copied from SNG Media’s main website and given fake publication dates. This little trick is a common SEO strategy, designed to make search engines perceive the site as older and, therefore, more legitimate, effectively gaming the system to appear more established than it truly is.
The true purpose of “Yerevan First” became strikingly clear in late 2025. It was then that the site pivoted, becoming a valuable tool for the Social Design Agency (ASP) to spread Kremlin influence, particularly in the lead-up to elections in Armenia. This transformation from a seemingly neutral news source to a platform for political maneuvering exposes the underlying agenda. The report to the Kremlin, which declared the site registered and licensed, conveniently overlooked the fact that the ASP and Shchetinin’s team had owned “Yerevan First” for several years beforehand, implying a calculated and long-term strategy of digital infiltration. Now, the site publishes several news items daily, consistently condemning Armenia’s current leadership. This switch to a overtly critical stance reveals the site’s true function as a propaganda mouthpiece, actively shaping public opinion against a specific political entity. This also highlights a significant aspect of modern information warfare: the strategic acquisition and gradual weaponization of seemingly benign digital assets to serve political objectives.
The individuals instrumental in this influence campaign are as intriguing as the operation itself. In 2025, alongside ASP heads Nikolai Tupikin and Ilya Gambashidze, the organization established the Strategic Communications Caspian 2030 autonomous nonprofit. A year later, in 2026, they founded the Union of Journalists of the CIS, further expanding their network and reach. One particularly noteworthy character is Alexei Ulyanov, an advertising specialist from Tver. Since 2012, Ulyanov has been honing his craft in crafting “sales texts,” advertising concepts, and SEO copy, boasting on his LinkedIn page about knowing the “secret of the selling word.” He has now rebranded himself as a political consultant and is a regular guest on Tsargrad television channel, a known platform for pro-Kremlin narratives. Ulyanov’s role is crucial: he oversees all writers in the “Doppelganger” campaign, a project dedicated to generating and disseminating manipulative content. Under his watchful eye, writers produce texts designed to sow discord and criticism, often highlighting perceived failings in Western nations while subtly promoting a particular geopolitical worldview. For instance, texts like the one highlighting poverty in France while it aids Ukraine serve to undermine confidence in Western stability and humanitarian efforts. These texts are then amplified across social media by ASP “commenters,” creating an echo chamber of carefully constructed narratives. Ulyanov’s analysis, conveniently, is also now published on “Yerevan First,” further solidifying the site’s role in this coordinated information campaign.
Another key figure is Andrei Perla, also an employee of Tsargrad and a veteran of the “Doppelganger” disinformation campaign, holding the title of chief ideologist. Perla’s expertise lies in conducting fake opinion polls in EU countries and Ukraine, a classic tactic to manipulate perceptions and create a false sense of public sentiment. In 2023, the U.S. State Department publicly accused him of spreading disinformation in Latin America, underscoring his extensive involvement in global influence operations. Perla, like Ulyanov, has an account in the “Yerevan First” publishing system. Furthermore, he, along with Alexei Ulyanov and Nikolai Tupikin, accesses the SNG Media admin panel through the Social Design Agency’s internal VPN, illustrating the interconnectedness and centralized control within this network. Finally, there’s Mikhail Ledakov, the former editor-in-chief of SNG Media. He’s known on social media as “the Conspirologist,” a fitting moniker given the nature of the information he’s associated with. Ledakov joined Shchetinin and the ASP after collaborating with Prigozhin’s Patriot media group, a notorious entity known for its involvement in various disinformation and influence campaigns. These individuals, with their history of manipulation and strategic communication, form a formidable team, expertly weaving narratives and shaping perceptions through outlets like “Yerevan First,” demonstrating the sophisticated and multifaceted nature of modern information warfare.