Imagine waking up in Warsaw, pouring your morning coffee, and opening your phone to a stream of alarming headlines. One says Polish soldiers are preparing to abandon NATO. Another claims Ukrainian refugees are receiving special housing while Polish veterans sleep on the streets. A third insists the government is hiding the true cost of the war just across the border. None of these stories are true. But they have been crafted with chilling precision, translated into perfect Polish, and pushed through thousands of anonymous accounts, fake news sites, and seemingly ordinary social media groups. For years, this has been the quiet reality of life in Poland—a country that has become a primary target of a relentless information war waged by the Kremlin. Now, after years of watching disinformation erode public trust, destabilize communities, and exploit every social fracture, the Polish government has decided to fight back in a way no European nation has dared before. It has announced the creation of a dedicated state Centre for Countering Disinformation—the first agency of its kind in Europe. This is not another bureaucratic committee or a symbolic declaration. It is a recognition that the old rules of warfare have changed, and that the most dangerous battles today are fought not with tanks, but with tweets, memes, and manufactured outrage.
The decision did not come out of nowhere. It was forced by an unprecedented escalation of hybrid attacks and subversive operations orchestrated by the Russian Federation and Belarus, aimed directly at destabilizing the social and political fabric of Poland. Polish intelligence services have watched with growing alarm as coordinated campaigns surged around key moments: the arrival of refugees, the buildup of NATO troops on the eastern flank, the delivery of military aid to Ukraine, and every election cycle. The methods are sophisticated and constantly evolving. Fake accounts are created by the thousands, often using stolen identities or AI-generated faces, and programmed to flood comment sections with anger. Entire websites are built to look like legitimate Polish news outlets, publishing carefully fabricated stories that are then amplified by bots and picked up by unwitting users. Deepfakes of Polish politicians have circulated, showing them saying things they never said. Local communities have been targeted with false information about vaccines, about the presence of foreign soldiers, about food shortages, about everything that could possibly stoke fear, resentment, and chaos. The goal is not simply to spread lies. The goal is to make people feel that nothing is true, that no one can be trusted, and that the only rational response is to turn away from public life altogether. It is a slow, corrosive form of psychological warfare, and Poland has been absorbing it for years, often alone.
The new Centre is designed to be a centralized, round-the-clock guardian of the country’s information space. Its responsibilities are broad and deeply practical. Specialists will monitor social media platforms, news websites, and messaging apps continuously, looking for patterns that indicate coordinated influence operations. They will identify bot farms, map their networks, and expose the infrastructure behind fake news. They will track the spread of harmful narratives in real time and work to neutralize them before they gain traction. Advanced big-data analysis and artificial intelligence tools will be deployed to detect anomalies in online behavior—sudden surges in activity, synchronized sharing, suspicious clusters of new accounts—that would be impossible for human analysts to catch alone. But the Centre is not meant to be a secretive surveillance apparatus. Its task is to understand the information environment, expose manipulation, and support the institutions that protect Polish democracy. It will work closely with the intelligence services, the Ministry of Digital Affairs, the Polish Armed Forces, and other relevant security agencies, creating a unified front against foreign interference. The idea is to move beyond the fragmented, reactive approach that has characterized many countries’ responses to disinformation, and instead build a permanent, institutionalized defense system that can anticipate threats, coordinate responses, and learn from every attack.
Perhaps the most important task of the Centre is protecting the trust that holds Polish society together. Disinformation campaigns are rarely aimed at convincing people of one specific lie. They are aimed at breaking down the shared sense of reality that makes democratic debate possible. When a false story claims that Warsaw is secretly abandoning its commitments to NATO, it does not just confuse people; it sows doubt about the entire chain of command. When a fabricated report says Ukrainian refugees are receiving preferential treatment, it does not just create resentment; it threatens the extraordinary solidarity that Poles have shown throughout the war. When a manipulated video shows a government official speaking words they never spoke, it does not just mislead; it makes citizens question whether they can believe their own eyes. The Centre’s specialists understand this. Their mission is not to police opinions or silence dissent, but to defend the factual groundwork upon which a healthy society depends. They will pay particular attention to narratives that undermine Poland’s defense policy, its alliances, and its comprehensive assistance to Ukraine—because these are the areas where Russian and Belarusian strategists have concentrated their efforts, hoping to weaken Poland from within and reduce its ability to support its neighbors. By neutralizing these false narratives early, the Centre aims to preserve the public’s confidence in its government, its military, and its democratic institutions.
No country can fight this fight entirely alone, and Poland knows it. That is why the Centre will be deeply integrated into the broader network of allied institutions, sharing intelligence, methods, and findings with NATO and European Union partners. Disinformation does not respect borders; a bot farm in St. Petersburg can target Polish citizens in one moment and German citizens the next. A single false story can be translated into a dozen languages within hours. The Centre’s collaboration with allied agencies is therefore not just a matter of goodwill—it is a strategic necessity. Polish experts will be able to compare notes with their counterparts in countries that have faced similar challenges, coordinate joint counter-operations, and contribute to the development of common standards for detecting and exposing foreign interference. The Polish government’s initiative has already been watched closely by other European capitals, many of which are struggling to respond to aggressive propaganda campaigns of their own. The authorities in Warsaw have made clear that they see the Centre not only as a tool for protecting Polish society, but also as a model that could be adapted by other nations. In an environment where Kremlin-backed media and online operatives have become bolder and more inventive, the need for a coordinated, institutional response has never been more urgent. Poland is positioning itself as a pioneer, willing to invest in the difficult, unglamorous work of defending the information space, and to share what it learns with its friends and allies.
In the end, the creation of the Centre for Countering Disinformation is about something deeper than algorithms, surveillance, or government coordination. It is about the resilience of ordinary people in the face of an enemy that attacks the mind rather than the body. Polish society has already shown extraordinary strength in the years since the full-scale war began in Ukraine—opening homes to millions of refugees, enduring economic pressure, and standing firm in its commitment to democracy and freedom. But resilience is not automatic; it must be nurtured, supported, and protected. The new Centre is an acknowledgment that citizens cannot be expected to navigate a digital battlefield alone, constantly second-guessing every headline, every video, every post. It is a promise that the state will do its part to clean up the information environment, to expose those who seek to manipulate public opinion, and to give people a fighting chance to discern truth from fiction. The fight against disinformation will never be fully won; the tactics will evolve, the technology will advance, and new vulnerabilities will emerge. But by building a dedicated institution, Poland is sending a clear message: we see the threat, we understand it, and we will not surrender the digital territory where the future of our democracy will be decided. It is a bold step, and it may not be perfect, but it is a necessary one—because in the long struggle against hybrid warfare, the truth itself has become the most precious battlefield.