In an age when information can be weaponized as powerfully as any missile, the health of a nation’s public discourse depends not only on its state institutions but also on its civil society. This was the essential message delivered by Mushfig Alasgarli, a member of the Language Commission of the Azerbaijan Press Council, during an experience-sharing session organized by the National NGO Forum with the participation of NGO Tech Talks experts. Addressing journalists, he underlined that non-governmental organizations have a vital part to play in protecting Azerbaijan’s information space from disinformation. His remarks were not abstract or theoretical; they came from a context where information attacks are felt in everyday life. For a country that has endured conflict, displacement, and a turbulent media environment, the ability of citizens to distinguish between truth and falsehood is a question of national resilience. The fact that he chose an NGO-focused event to make this point was itself significant. It acknowledged that no government ministry or security agency can defend the public sphere alone. NGOs are often the institutions closest to the people, especially at the local level. They have trusted relationships, on-the-ground knowledge, and the ability to translate complex issues into language that ordinary citizens understand. In protecting the information environment, they can act as bridges between the official world and communities, between digital platforms and local realities. Alasgarli’s words were therefore a call to action: every civil society organization must see itself as a participant in the defense of truth, a defender of the public’s right to accurate and honest information.
The urgency of this mission is hard to overstate. Alasgarli drew attention to the growing volume of disinformation and reminded the audience that the World Economic Forum has ranked disinformation among the leading global risks. That ranking is not an isolated statistic; it reflects a global reality where fabricated stories, manipulated videos, and coordinated influence campaigns can destabilize entire societies. Falsehoods spread faster than the truth, particularly when they exploit fear, anger, or national pride. For a country like Azerbaijan, sitting in a complicated geopolitical region, these risks are concrete and constant. Disinformation often tries to distort the country’s territorial integrity, inflame ethnic tensions, undermine interfaith harmony, or tarnish its reputation abroad. It feeds on old stereotypes and creates new conflicts where none existed. The WEF’s warning gives international legitimacy to what Azerbaijani civil society has been saying for years: disinformation is not a side effect of the internet but a systemic weapon, deployed deliberately by malicious actors. Governments have the authority to regulate and respond, but they cannot monitor every conversation or fact-check every post. This is precisely why NGOs are indispensable. They can serve as independent watchdogs, monitor media trends, expose false narratives, and train citizens in critical thinking. They can also provide an early warning system, spotting harmful trends before they spiral out of control. By grounding the conversation in the WEF’s global risk assessment, Alasgarli framed Azerbaijan’s struggle as part of a worldwide effort, a shared fight for the integrity of public information that crosses borders and demands solidarity.
Alasgarli also recalled the active phase of the Karabakh war, a time when online attacks became part of the battlefield itself. During those intense weeks, the websites of some Azerbaijani media outlets, NGOs, and think tanks came under cyberattacks, disrupting their operations and blocking access to information. These attacks were not random acts of online vandalism; they were coordinated efforts to silence independent voices and create confusion. In a time of crisis, people depend on reliable news about the front, the safety of loved ones, and the movements of the enemy. When websites crash or spread false alerts, the emotional and social cost is enormous. Rumors can spread panic in minutes, and a single fake update can undermine trust in official military communication. Alasgarli emphasized technical security as an essential part of resilience. For many civil society groups, this was a harsh lesson. They realized that having a strong mission is not enough if your own digital infrastructure is weak. Basic protections such as secure passwords, encrypted communications, regular backups, and training to recognize phishing attempts became matters of organizational survival. The memory of those attacks has not faded. It shaped a generation of Azerbaijani civil society actors who understand that cybersecurity is not an obscure technical subject but a precondition for doing their job at all. When public access to information is deliberately cut off, the first casualty is trust. The second is the ability of citizens to make informed decisions. Alasgarli’s reference to this period was therefore not nostalgic; it was a reminder of how vulnerable the information space can become, and how necessary it is for NGOs to prepare for the next possible storm.
What role should NGOs play in this ongoing challenge? According to Alasgarli, civil society institutions, especially NGOs and media organizations, are already taking active steps both to strengthen their own security and to raise public awareness. This dual strategy is crucial. On the one hand, organizations must practice what they preach. They need to protect their own digital spaces before they can protect the public conversation. This can mean adopting stronger data protection policies, using secure tools, conducting security audits, and sharing threat intelligence with partner organizations. Many Azerbaijani NGOs have learned these lessons through direct experience, often after being attacked or infiltrated. International donors have also begun to support cybersecurity capacity-building, and local networks are increasingly pooling their knowledge. On the other hand, self-defense is not the final goal. NGOs must translate what they learn into public education. This means organizing workshops for students, journalists, teachers, and even elderly internet users. It means producing simple guides on how to verify photos, identify fake social media accounts, and reverse-search suspicious images. It also means advocating for media literacy in schools, so that the next generation grows up with a natural instinct to question what they see online. Raising public awareness is perhaps the most powerful countermeasure against disinformation because a well-informed audience is far more difficult to manipulate. When citizens understand the difference between a source and a rumor, when they know how to check a website’s origins or recognize a manipulated video, they become less vulnerable to foreign influence operations. Alasgarli’s comments suggest that Azerbaijani NGOs are not waiting for instructions from above. They are developing their own capacities, testing new approaches, and bringing the issue of information security into everyday public debate.
Another important contribution of NGOs is their work in producing reliable content and actively exposing disinformation, especially content created abroad and directed at Azerbaijan’s information space. Countering lies requires more than just correcting false statements; it requires compelling alternative narratives. Facts alone do not always win hearts and minds. People need stories, context, and analysis that can push falsehoods out of the public square. Azerbaijani NGOs have stepped into this gap by creating fact-checking platforms, verification projects, and independent investigations. They cooperate with international fact-checking networks and use digital tools to trace the sources of suspicious stories. When they discover coordinated campaigns, they do not remain silent. They publish their findings, call on social media platforms to remove harmful content, and alert partners abroad. The National NGO Forum, in particular, has issued multiple public statements over the years, exposing disinformation campaigns and appealing to media outlets that knowingly or unknowingly disseminate them, calling for such practices to stop. This kind of advocacy is important because it moves the fight beyond individual cases and toward setting ethical standards for the entire media ecosystem. NGOs are not simply engaging in negative criticism; they are building a culture of accountability. By naming the worst offenders and appealing to professional journalists to resist manipulation, they create reputational pressure. By speaking out publicly, they make it clear that spreading disinformation has consequences. This role as a watchdog, and not only an educator, is essential. It demonstrates that civil society can hold both state and non-state actors responsible. It also proves that defending Azerbaijan’s information space does not require censorship or control. It requires transparency, courage, and consistent collective action.
Ultimately, the message from Mushfig Alasgarli is a reminder that information security is a shared responsibility. In today’s world, national borders are not barriers to influence campaigns; a single smartphone is enough to flood a country with misleading content. Azerbaijan, like every other nation, is exposed to an endless stream of messages designed to confuse, polarize, and demoralize. No government can fight this battle alone. Officials may create regulations, block dangerous websites, and protect critical digital infrastructure, but they cannot force citizens to think critically. That is where civil society has its unique strength. NGOs are often trusted by local communities in ways that formal state institutions are not. They can listen carefully, tailor their messages to different audiences, and build alliances across ethnic, religious, and political lines. The event organized by the National NGO Forum and NGO Tech Talks was a perfect example of this spirit. It allowed activists, journalists, and technical experts to learn from each other, share lessons, and coordinate future efforts. It also sent a signal that Azerbaijan’s civil society is awake, organized, and ready to defend the public information space. The challenge remaining is enormous, especially as disinformation campaigns become more sophisticated with artificial intelligence, deepfakes, and microtargeting. NGOs will need to keep adapting, invest in new skills, and strengthen international cooperation. They must also protect their own credibility, because in the fight for truth, their integrity is their most valuable asset. If they can do that, they will continue to play an essential role in ensuring that Azerbaijan’s information sphere remains a place for honest debate and trustworthy knowledge. The words of Alasgarli, calm, practical, and grounded in real experience, offer a clear roadmap. Protecting the truth is not a task that is ever completed; it is a daily commitment. But with strong civil society at the table, Azerbaijan is far better prepared to face the storms of disinformation and emerge with its public trust intact.

