Welcome, valued guests, to this year’s conference. It’s natural to believe that the freer information flows, the stronger our societies become. After all, a healthy democracy thrives when citizens and the media can hold their governments accountable. Yet, we live in a perplexing time where this very notion is being challenged. The digital landscape has evolved so rapidly that the truth itself seems to be vanishing. Not long ago, attempts to corrupt information were relatively crude; we’d see bot farms from China and Russia pushing out divisive narratives on our social feeds. But then, Artificial Intelligence entered the scene, changing everything.
AI, in many ways, is a marvel with immense potential for good. We see its positive impact in healthcare, robotics, and even defense. However, there’s a darker side. AI tools can now generate manipulative content at an astonishing speed, scale, and low cost. Fake AI-generated videos and images are no longer a novelty; they’re becoming disturbingly common. Remember that viral video of Brad Pitt and Tom Cruise fighting on a skyscraper? Pure AI fantasy. This technology has propelled cognitive warfare to a whole new level, affecting not just the entertainment industry but also our democratic processes. Consider Romania in 2024: a Russia-backed disinformation campaign, supercharged by AI, artificially magnified a fringe, pro-Russian, far-right candidate online. Thousands of AI-powered bot accounts flooded platforms with deepfakes, complemented by paid TikTok influencers promoting Russia’s preferred candidate. Without Romania’s robust constitutional safeguards, the outcome of that election could have been drastically different. Democracy, at its core, relies on trust. If we can’t distinguish fact from fiction, we become vulnerable to manipulation. This insidious erosion of truth, known as Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI), is like a thousand small cuts bleeding democracy dry. The public feels this threat acutely: recent Eurobarometer data reveals that nearly 80% of Europeans are worried about voters being swayed by disinformation, and over 60% fear external pressure. Europe has spent over a decade developing expertise in this area; we understand the weapon, its components, and how it’s fired. This is a cognitive war, and we must learn to fight back.
Our counter-offensive against information manipulation is being waged on three crucial fronts. The first is right here, within the European Union. Foreign interference thrives because it’s highly profitable. Information manipulation is one of the most cost-effective tools in modern hybrid warfare. Last year alone, Russia and China poured an estimated 11 billion euros into these malicious activities, while the global economic impact of disinformation is staggering, exceeding 400 billion euros annually. There’s a sophisticated marketplace for manipulation now, where actors outsource these operations to intermediaries, including private companies, influence-for-hire networks, and digital marketing firms. To combat this, we must dismantle their business model. One strategy is to sanction the perpetrators, as we’ve done for many individuals and businesses spreading propaganda about Russia’s invasion of Ukraine or anti-Western narratives. But these perpetrators are agile, adapting as quickly as we apply sanctions, so we need to do more. We know, for example, that these actors exploit cryptocurrencies to lure young people into undermining European democracy, and that entrepreneurs are selling their technical expertise, influencer networks, and bot farms. A logical step would be to intensify tax probes and cyber investigations into crypto wallets and illicit money flows, coordinating these efforts at a European level where necessary. We also have to better regulate the digital space. Social media platforms, at a minimum, must cooperate with European authorities investigating these perpetrators, helping to reduce their impact and prevent them from scaling up. We have robust regulations in place, like the Digital Services Act and the EU’s Code of Conduct on Disinformation, which demand strong engagement from platforms to ensure a safer online environment. We’ve developed tools to fight disinformation and tackle unlawful, misleading, discriminatory, or fraudulent content. However, we face a serious problem when major platforms abuse their market power, seemingly influenced by actors openly supporting specific political groups in our countries. With numerous elections approaching in Europe this year and next, we must find the political courage to fully deploy our regulations and tools to safeguard our democracies. The “Democracy Shield” was created precisely for this purpose, bringing together various initiatives from the Rapid Alert System for tracking disinformation to the European Cooperation Network on Elections, which fosters best practice sharing among Member States. A challenging question remains: is it wise to entrust our democratic spaces to social networks controlled by large American and Chinese companies? It’s a thought worth considering deeply.
The second front in this battle against information manipulation lies in our neighborhood. Countries drawing closer to the European Union often become primary targets for foreign interference. We witnessed this in Georgia and, unfortunately, failed to adequately counter it. We’ve seen it tirelessly in Ukraine for over a decade, and we are actively fighting it there. But in Moldova last year, through collaborative efforts with Moldovan authorities, we achieved a significant victory. This battle can be won. To grasp the enormity of what Moldova faced, estimates suggest Russia funneled between 200 and 300 million euros into pro-Russian voices—an amount equivalent to 2-3% of Moldova’s entire GDP. Yet, Russia’s interference collapsed because we fought back, together. Before the elections, Moldovan authorities were incredibly vocal and proactive about the risks of fraud and interference. They introduced prison sentences for vote-buying and worked closely with intelligence agencies to investigate and expose these operations. Staff from the European External Action Service played a crucial role in these investigations. Concurrently, there was a massive communications push to highlight the tangible benefits of EU membership for citizens, engaging a diverse range of people from TV stars and musicians to NGOs and even the Church. High-profile visits from European leaders also significantly elevated the EU’s profile in the country. These efforts blunted attacks against the EU and underscored what Moldova would lose by remaining outside. Crucially, it wasn’t just about talking; it was about showing. By mid-last year, most Moldovan villages had something concrete—a new park, a playground, or even running water—to demonstrate the real-world improvements of being part of the European family. When people experience direct improvements in their lives, their choices become clear. This approach also explains why the Growth Plan for the Western Balkans is so vital for gathering support for enlargement across the region. We can be absolutely certain that foreign actors will not cease their attempts to interfere in democratic spaces in the immediate future. Following their bungled attempt in Moldova, Russia has now begun targeting Armenia with the same playbook, but this time, they started much earlier, over a year in advance of elections. We’re also seeing similar interference in Montenegro, which aims to join the EU by 2028. Countries can empower themselves by investigating, criminalizing, and prosecuting aspects of this interference—be it vote-buying or information manipulation—and presenting the unvarnished facts to their citizens. The EU will always stand by its friends in this fight. For instance, at Armenia’s request, we will deploy a Hybrid Rapid Response Team in April ahead of their June elections. Our first Security and Defence Dialogue with Montenegro in December also focused on combating FIMI, a crucial first step towards establishing a Security and Defence Partnership, similar to those we already have with North Macedonia and Albania, and an increasing number of global partners.
Foreign interference isn’t confined to Europe, our immediate neighborhood, or even solely to democracies. This brings us to the third crucial front: the international sphere. Last year alone, over a hundred countries were attacked by FIMI. Hundreds of individuals, including heads of state, and nearly two hundred organizations, including NATO, were targeted. A major concern in this global fight against information manipulation is the void left by the United States. Once a leader in combating foreign interference, the U.S. State Department has unfortunately scaled back most of this critical work. The withdrawal of U.S. funding for information integrity has had a ripple effect, slowing down efforts by the G7 and NATO. Yet, the threat hasn’t diminished; FIMI is on the rise as the global democratic space shrinks. Europe must step up to fill this gap. Wherever I travel to meet counterparts around the world, there’s a constant plea from partners: “How do we protect our societies from these attacks?” The European External Action Service offers a blueprint for detecting, understanding, and responding to these threats. While our primary focus is on Russian and Chinese-backed interference, given our unique challenges, the same approach can be adapted to threats originating from any country. Fighting foreign information manipulation and interference is a key component of our Security and Defence Partnerships with many nations, a group that will soon include Australia, Iceland, and Ghana. But again, we must do more. Ask anyone, anywhere—in a democracy or not—if malignant foreign interference in their country’s information space is welcome, and the answer will always be a resounding “no.” Information integrity is a global public good. That’s why I’m committed to building an international coalition to safeguard the information space. Alongside maritime security and AI governance, this is an area desperately needing a collective response. Important issues, such as the suppression of free media, must be addressed.
Dear guests, the infrastructure our adversaries use is built like a house of cards. Our 2026 report clearly outlines this. We know who is behind the meddling, how they operate, whom they target, and their vulnerabilities. By adopting a more assertive approach, both online and offline, we can bring their flimsy structures crashing down. Everyone has a role to play: politicians and law enforcement must collaborate to dismantle the business model and regulate the digital space. The European Union must continue to support its neighbors, as we did in Moldova and will do in Armenia. Personally, I will continue to share our knowledge with international partners and work towards building a strong alliance of countries committed to fighting for information integrity. And finally, there is a fundamental public duty to counter lies with the unwavering force of truth. Foreign information manipulation and interference is a deliberate attempt to leave citizens confused and disoriented, eroding the very foundations of our democracies. Without information integrity – without reliable and fact-based information – we cannot make informed choices about anything, from our health to the education of our children, to the leaders we elect. Yes, democracy on our continent is stronger than anywhere else in the world. Our countries possess safeguards that work, as evidenced in Romania. And there is immense strength in our unity, which proved decisive in Moldova. However, every national election is now a target for interference. 2026 could bring a perfect storm across Europe. We must all remain vigilant and engaged in this fight. So, go forth and spread the truth. Thank you.