The recent start of Israel’s election cycle has already provided a troubling glimpse into the future of political campaigning. A jarring instance involved an AI-generated video from the Likud party, which depicted Gadi Eisenkot interacting with the leader of the Ra’am party. The imagery was particularly cruel, as viewers noted a striking resemblance between a figure in the video and Eisenkot’s son, Gal, who tragically fell in Gaza in late 2023. While the party later replaced the figure and denied any ill-intent, the incident served as a stark warning: the barrier between legitimate political discourse and weaponized deception has become perilously thin.
We are currently navigating our first national election since the October 7 massacre, a period defined by intense societal trauma and volatility. With the rapid evolution of artificial intelligence, bad actors—both domestic and foreign—now have the tools to manufacture false realities. They can synthesize voices, mirror mannerisms, and create convincing videos of events that never transpired. When this technology is applied to a fractured political landscape, it becomes a potent engine for misinformation, capable of inflaming tensions and eroding the public’s ability to discern truth from fabrication.
The Central Elections Committee has made a necessary, though modest, attempt to mitigate this threat by issuing temporary regulations. Under these new rules, any campaign material that has been digitally altered or generated must be clearly labeled, with warnings appearing prominently on videos and at the start and end of audio clips. While these mandates are a step in the right direction, they are ultimately insufficient. Labels function as a notification system, not a shield, and they do little to stop the viral spread of deceptive content through unregulated platforms like Telegram, WhatsApp, or autonomous social media accounts before regulators can even intervene.
To truly preserve the integrity of our democracy, political parties must be held strictly accountable for the content they produce and promote. It is no longer acceptable for campaigns to benefit from illicit “shadow” advertising while shifting blame to surrogates or anonymous pages. We require a robust, rapid-response mechanism from the Central Elections Committee—one that can address complaints in real-time. Mere labels aren’t enough; if the penalties for spreading synthetic misinformation are weak, campaigns will simply view them as the “cost of doing business,” eventually incentivizing the very deception these rules intend to prevent.
The scope of this challenge extends well beyond our borders. Security experts have pointed to the influence of hostile foreign actors—including reports involving Turkey and Iran—who are actively seeking to exploit internal Israeli divisions. These automated networks and state-sponsored digital campaigns won’t be deterred by local labeling requirements. Israel urgently needs a centralized, non-partisan authority dedicated to tracking foreign influence operations and informing the public. This entity must be insulated from the political fray, ensuring that its only focus is the protection of our national information sovereignty, regardless of which party is in power.
Ultimately, the goal of regulation should not be to stifle democratic debate, parody, or legitimate political satire. Israel has a long, vibrant tradition of humor, and we must ensure that new laws don’t protect politicians from fair criticism or embarrassment. The clear red line must be deception—the intentional manufacturing of falsehoods to manipulate how citizens perceive reality. A democracy cannot function if its voters are forced to choose between competing versions of a fake reality; we must protect the shared factual world that serves as the foundation for our political choices and our future.