Navigating Election Information in Pretoria: A Guide to Truth in the Digital Age

In the bustling streets of Pretoria, election news travels faster than ever before, often finding its way into the palms of residents’ hands before they even think to search for it. The flow of information has become woven into the very fabric of daily life, appearing in family WhatsApp groups where relatives share updates alongside birthday wishes and dinner plans, popping up in Facebook feeds between photos of children and holiday memories, and sliding through TikTok videos that blend entertainment with political commentary. Messages forwarded by neighbors and friends carry the weight of personal trust, even when the content they contain might not deserve such confidence. While many people share election-related information with genuine belief in its accuracy, a more troubling reality lurks beneath the surface—content deliberately crafted and distributed with the specific purpose of misleading voters and manipulating public opinion. As Pretoria prepares for the 2026 local government elections, the Electoral Commission of South Africa (IEC) has stepped forward with a new tool designed to protect the integrity of the democratic process: an electoral code of conduct focused specifically on countering disinformation. This code establishes clear rules for political parties, candidates, and their representatives when communicating with voters through both online platforms and traditional offline channels. The framework, which took effect on September 4 and remains in force until election results are officially declared, represents a significant effort to support free, fair, and orderly elections in a time when information—both true and false—spreads at unprecedented speed. For residents navigating this complex landscape, understanding the distinction between different types of misleading information becomes not just helpful but essential for making informed democratic choices.

The difference between misinformation and disinformation might seem subtle at first glance, but it carries significant weight in how residents should interpret and respond to questionable content. Misinformation, the more benign of the two, refers to false or inaccurate information shared without any intention to deceive. Picture a Pretoria resident who receives a message about voting dates and forwards it to their neighborhood WhatsApp group, genuinely believing the information to be correct. They had no malicious intent—they simply made an honest mistake, perhaps misreading a post or misremembering a date they heard in passing conversation. While the result might still be confusion, the person who shared it believed they were being helpful. Disinformation, on the other hand, operates on an entirely different level of intent. This involves false or misleading information deliberately created and shared with the specific purpose of deceiving audiences, causing harm, or manipulating how people understand political issues. The IEC’s definition sharpens this further, describing election disinformation as false or misleading content shared by someone who either knows it is untrue or has no reasonable basis for believing it might be true, with the clear intention of misleading voters or disrupting the electoral process. The distinction largely comes down to intent—the difference between someone who accidentally passes along a wrong date and someone who deliberately fabricates a story about a candidate to damage their reputation. However, residents should understand that regardless of intent, both types of misleading information can spread rapidly through social networks, leaving people uncertain about what they can genuinely trust and what they should question.

The warning signs that residents should look out for are numerous and varied, reflecting the many creative ways that misleading information can manifest in the digital landscape. The IEC has highlighted several specific areas where voters should exercise particular caution, including posts that make claims about voting dates, voting times, voting station locations, registration requirements, or eligibility criteria. A falsely altered voting date could keep residents away from the polls or send them to the wrong locations, directly impacting their ability to participate in democracy. Beyond factual claims about logistics, residents should be alert to fake statements or announcements attributed to the IEC or its officials. These fabricated communications might appear official at first glance, but checking them against the commission’s official communication channels can quickly reveal their true nature. The digital ecosystem presents additional challenges through fake accounts and coordinated networks of bots designed to create the false impression that a particular political view enjoys more popularity than it actually does. This manufactured consensus can sway undecided voters who might be influenced by what they perceive as majority opinion. Political advertising that fails to clearly identify who paid for or distributed it represents another red flag, as transparency about funding sources helps voters evaluate potential biases. The code also addresses more invasive practices like doxxing—sharing someone’s private information without consent to cause them harm—and distinguishes this from legitimate political criticism. Perhaps most concerning in our increasingly sophisticated technological age is the threat of AI-generated or manipulated images, videos, and audio. Under the code, political parties and candidates must clearly label synthetic content before distributing it, but residents should still develop their own skills for spotting potential manipulation. While unusual facial movements, unnatural lighting, distorted hands, or blurred edges might indicate AI generation, these signs alone cannot definitively confirm that content has been manipulated.

Taking proactive steps to verify information before accepting or sharing it represents the most effective defense against falling victim to election disinformation. The safest first step, and perhaps the most important one, is simply to pause before sharing anything that arrives through messaging apps or social media. This brief moment of reflection creates space for critical thinking that could prevent the spread of false information. Residents should then check where the information originated, examining whether the account sharing the content appears genuine and whether the claim appears on official IEC platforms or is supported by credible news organizations. If a post claims that the IEC has changed a voting date or relocated a voting venue, the responsible approach involves verifying this directly through the commission rather than relying on forwarded messages that might have traveled through multiple hands. A reverse-image search can prove invaluable when dealing with photographs, allowing users to search for an image and discover where else it has appeared across the internet. Services like Google Images and TinEye make this process relatively simple. For example, an old photograph taken at an entirely different event or in a completely different location could be presented as a current Pretoria incident, creating a misleading impression about recent events. By conducting this simple check, residents can establish whether a photo is being used out of context or represents genuine current evidence. These verification steps might require a small investment of time, but they represent a modest price to pay for protecting democratic participation and preventing manipulation.

Political parties and candidates operating under the new code face substantial responsibilities that extend well beyond merely avoiding the creation of misleading content. They must check information for accuracy before distributing it, taking full responsibility for content published by them, for them, or on their behalf by representatives and supporters. This requirement shifts the burden from voters to information creators, holding those who produce political communications accountable for their accuracy. The code further mandates that parties and candidates who become aware they have distributed false or misleading information must publicly retract and correct it within thirty-six hours and, where appropriate, censure those responsible for the initial error. This accountability mechanism ensures that mistakes, when they occur, receive swift and visible correction rather than being allowed to fester and spread. The code also prohibits deceptive practices including fake accounts, bot networks, coordinated inauthentic behavior, doxxing, and cyberbullying—practices that use underhanded methods to gain political advantage. Parties and candidates must report instances of online election disinformation to Real411 within thirty-six hours of becoming aware of them, participating actively in the monitoring and reporting ecosystem rather than passively waiting for issues to be identified. They must also promote awareness of the code among their members and supporters, ensuring that everyone involved in their political operations understands and follows the established standards. The code additionally prohibits disinformation targeting the IEC itself, its commissioners, or staff members, with parties required to publicly correct such information when it occurs. These comprehensive requirements recognize that political parties exist within networks of supporters and representatives whose actions reflect on the entire organization, requiring a culture of accountability that extends throughout their operations.

For residents who encounter suspected disinformation, the IEC has established Real411 as the official platform for reporting election-related concerns. This designated system provides a structured pathway for members of the public to submit suspected digital harms for assessment by the Digital Complaints Committee. When submitting a complaint, residents should provide supporting information including a link or screenshot of the content and details about where and when they encountered it. While complaints cannot be submitted anonymously, the complainant’s identity is kept confidential throughout the complaints process, protecting those who come forward with concerns from potential retaliation. Residents can submit election-related complaints through the Real411 complaints portal, which guides users through the submission process. The complaints process can result in various outcomes, including matters being reviewed, referred to another appropriate body, or addressed through other suitable measures. Election-related complaints are shared with the IEC’s Directorate for Electoral Offences, ensuring that potential legal violations receive appropriate attention, while independent outcomes are submitted to the IEC for consideration. This multi-layered approach creates accountability at multiple levels, from immediate review to potential electoral offense proceedings. The ultimate aim of this entire framework is not to discourage political debate, legitimate criticism, or robust discussion of important issues facing Pretoria residents. Rather, it seeks to help residents distinguish between genuine political discussion and content that may deliberately mislead them. In a democratic society, vigorous debate and challenging discourse represent healthy components of civic life, and nothing in this code should be interpreted as limiting those essential freedoms. The goal is simply to create a level playing field where voters can make decisions based on accurate information rather than manipulated content.