This research, conducted under the ATAFIMI project, brings together a coalition of fact-checking organizations—including StopFake, Delfi, Myth Detector, and Maldita.es—to combat the evolving threat of Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI). By pooling resources and utilizing a unified analytical methodology, these organizations have created a technological repository to track cross-border disinformation. This collaborative effort is essential for identifying how specific narratives are synchronized to circulate simultaneously across Europe and Latin America, allowing researchers to map the invisible infrastructure behind global campaigns that seek to destabilize public trust.
A primary weapon in this digital arsenal is “hahaganda”—a term coined by academic Solvita Denisa-Liepniece to describe the use of humor, ridicule, and humiliation as a strategic tool of war. Unlike traditional propaganda, which attempts to persuade, hahaganda focuses on undermining the credibility of individuals or institutions through constant mockery. Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, President Volodymyr Zelensky has been a central target of these attacks. Early methods involved crude image manipulations, such as portraying him as a clown or associating him with extremist imagery, but the landscape shifted dramatically with the advent of generative AI, which allows for the creation of seamless deepfakes that depict fabricated events, such as fake political capitulations, to foster a false sense of failure.
These disinformation campaigns are increasingly designed for an international audience, going beyond simple attacks to create the illusion of widespread global disillusionment. By co-opting Western figures, celebrities, and even reputable media outlets, bad actors cultivate a narrative that Ukraine’s allies have turned against it. A clear example of this is the “fake graffiti” phenomenon, where manipulated images of street art in capital cities like Paris, Madrid, and Warsaw were circulated to suggest that local populations were mocking or despising the Ukrainian leadership. These activities are often part of broader “active measures,” such as Operation Overload, which intentionally floods fact-checkers and journalists with fake inquiries to exhaust their resources and distract them from genuine threats.
The impersonation of prestigious media outlets, such as the French satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo, has become a persistent strategy to lend a veneer of legitimacy to these smears. By forging covers that feature caricature-laden attacks on Zelensky, propagandists manipulate current events—such as museum thefts or celebrity visits—to frame the Ukrainian president as a looter. These fabrications are typically launched via Telegram channels before being “laundered” through other platforms like TikTok or Facebook. This tactical sequence helps the content bypass initial scrutiny, eventually reaching international audiences who may not realize they are consuming counterfeit journalism designed by external geopolitical interests.
The assault on Ukraine’s credibility extends beyond its political leadership to the dehumanization of its armed forces. Utilizing AI to generate fake videos—such as depictions of obese soldiers or soldiers begging for their lives—campaigners aim to erode the morale of the Ukrainian military and alienate international support. A sophisticated network, such as the “telemarathon” account identified by the Lithuanian organization Delfi, mimics the authentic look and feel of news broadcasts to present AI-generated fiction as verified reality. By blending satire with fabricated emotional narratives, these operations seek to portray the Ukrainian military as hopeless and disorganized, directly serving the Kremlin’s goal of deterring foreign volunteers and public sympathy.
Ultimately, the success of these operations relies on public participation; the algorithm favors stories that provoke a “share,” “like,” or heated comment. The ATAFIMI project highlights that combating this cycle requires more than just debunking individual claims; it requires an awareness of the intent behind the humor. By systematically tracking these narratives, researchers are revealing the cold, strategic machinery behind the “jokes” circulating on our screens. As artificial intelligence continues to lower the barrier to entry for creating high-quality, deceptive content, this cross-border collaboration serves as a vital safeguard, protecting the integrity of our information ecosystems from those who would use caricature and cynicism to dismantle democracy from within.