Disinformation Campaigns Threaten Syria’s Fragile Transition After Assad’s Ouster
BEIRUT – Syria’s transition to a new era following the ousting of President Bashar al-Assad in December is being threatened by a surge of online disinformation aimed at igniting sectarian strife. Analysts warn that former allies and opponents of Assad are weaponizing digital platforms to destabilize the nascent order, exploiting existing tensions and fears within Syrian society. The campaign involves a complex web of domestic and foreign actors, including Russia, China, Iran, and Israel, each pursuing their own agendas. This digital battleground is reminiscent of the civil war, where online platforms were used to influence the conflict, but now the stakes are arguably higher as the country seeks to rebuild and establish a new power structure.
The primary target of these disinformation campaigns is social cohesion. Bassam Alahmad, CEO of Syrians for Truth and Justice, emphasizes the destructive power of these online tactics, stating that disinformation "is harming people no less than weapons." The sudden shift in power from Assad’s Alawite minority rule to the Sunni Islamist Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) has created a fertile ground for exploiting existing sectarian fault lines. Despite HTS severing ties with al Qaeda and pledging to protect religious minorities, anxieties remain high, providing ample opportunity for malicious actors to spread false narratives and incite unrest.
Foreign powers are playing a significant role in this information war. While Iranian, Russian, Israeli, and Chinese officials have not commented on their alleged involvement, analysts point to sophisticated campaigns orchestrated by these actors. Zouhir Al-Shimale, communications director at Verify Syria, an independent fact-checking organization, describes these campaigns as leveraging social media platforms, fake profiles, bots, and even AI-generated personas to manipulate public opinion. These campaigns exploit existing anxieties, particularly within minority groups like the Alawites, who fear reprisals after Assad’s fall.
A prime example of this manipulation is the widely circulated video showing a fire at an Alawite shrine in Aleppo. While the Interior Ministry confirmed the video predated HTS’s takeover, the timing of its release coincided with widespread unrest, including protests in Homs and the coastal region, home to a large Alawite population. This incident exemplifies how easily manipulated narratives can exacerbate tensions and incite violence, highlighting the potency of disinformation in a volatile environment. The incident also underscores the challenges facing fact-checking organizations like Verify Syria, who are working to debunk false narratives and promote accurate information.
The information warfare extends beyond traditional social media platforms. WhatsApp, immensely popular in Syria, has become another battleground. Ruslan Trad, a researcher at the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensics Lab, notes that Assad loyalists are using the platform to disseminate unverified reports, creating an impression of chaos and instability. This tactic exploits the closed nature of WhatsApp groups, where information spreads rapidly with little scrutiny. Meanwhile, China-linked accounts have attempted to capitalize on Assad’s downfall to promote anti-U.S. narratives, blaming "American democracy" for Syria’s destruction. However, these attempts have largely failed to gain traction outside their own echo chambers.
Beyond the spread of outright falsehoods, the more insidious threat lies in the weaponization of narratives. Andreas Krieg, associate professor at King’s College London, points out that while disinformation is often easily debunked, the real danger lies in how actors twist events to fit pre-existing agendas and mobilize communities against potential consensus. He cites the example of Israeli troops moving into the Golan Heights, after which pro-Israel accounts circulated a video of a local figure calling for Israeli protection. While representing a fringe opinion, the video was used to falsely portray widespread Druze support for Israeli intervention. Russia, Iran, and Israel have been identified as the primary drivers of these narrative manipulations, each seeking to influence the trajectory of post-Assad Syria.
The pervasive influence of disinformation is further compounded by the perceived bias of local Syrian media. Political interference and a lack of transparency hinder these outlets from effectively combating false narratives. Bassam Alahmad argues that many local media outlets prioritize propaganda over truth, driven by fear of reprisal. He stresses the critical need for independent media activists and capacity building to promote accurate reporting and empower citizens to discern truth from falsehoods. This underscores the long-term challenge of rebuilding trust in media institutions and fostering a robust information ecosystem in post-Assad Syria. The ongoing disinformation campaigns highlight the urgent need for international cooperation and support to counter these threats and ensure a stable and peaceful transition for the Syrian people.