Inside the Cyprus Forum in Nicosia, a room filled with policy-makers, academics, journalists and concerned citizens came together to confront one of the most corrosive challenges of the modern democratic era: disinformation. The session, titled ‘Disinformation as a Democratic Security Threat: From Detection to Public Response,’ was not an abstract seminar. It was a conversation about the very conditions that allow lies to take root in open societies, and about the difficult work of building defenses without destroying the openness we seek to protect. British High Commissioner Michael Tatham opened the discussion with a message that shaped everything that followed: disinformation is a transnational problem. It crosses borders as easily as digital data, adapts to local languages and anxieties, and attacks different societies with similar techniques. For that reason, Tatham argued, it can only be answered by a transnational response. He was joined by the French Ambassador, Clelia Chevrier Kolacko, and Christodoulos Ioannou, co-founder of the Cyprus Security and Intelligence Institute, each bringing a distinct lens: diplomatic, strategic and civic. What emerged from their conversation was not a single silver bullet, but a shared conviction. Disinformation is not merely an inconvenient political nuisance; it is a security threat because it undermines the trust on which democracy rests. It makes citizens uncertain of what is true, deepens polarization, and weakens faith in institutions. Yet the speakers were careful not to sound defeatist. They saw the problem clearly, but they also saw that a coordinated, principled and resilient response is possible.
Tatham began by recalling how recently the world has woken up to this threat. A decade ago, only a small handful of specialists and researchers were talking about disinformation, and most governments were not listening. Today it has become part of international conversations, but recognition must be translated into action. The High Commissioner proposed a series of priorities, each one building on the last. First, disinformation must remain firmly on the international agenda. It cannot be treated as a fleeting concern or a matter for tech companies alone; it must be understood as a core challenge to democratic security. Second, he stressed the importance of cooperation between states. There is real strength in numbers, he argued. When one country denounces another for running disinformation campaigns, it can be dismissed as politically motivated or easily targeted for retaliation. But when several democracies speak out together, they create a shared shield and a louder voice. Joint denunciation is not just symbolically powerful; it is strategically safer and more credible. Third, Tatham called for the development of international frameworks to support cooperation. Many countries have built national mechanisms, inter-ministerial committees and specialized units, but these operate in isolation. What is needed now are common standards, shared expertise and networks that allow democracies to coordinate their responses. Finally, he added an element often overlooked: direct support for countries on the front line. He cited Moldova’s 2024 elections as a powerful example. Moldova, he noted, was particularly vulnerable to Russian disinformation, and the UK, working with other partners, had helped expose such campaigns and defend the integrity of its democratic process. “The more countries with shared democratic values are willing to cooperate in this area, the better,” he said. “We are more effective when democracies with shared values cooperate, share knowledge and take joint action.”
The French Ambassador, Clelia Chevrier Kolacko, then offered a detailed and compelling account of how France has organized its own response. She began with a clear warning: disinformation is a reality. It affects even issues that may at first seem trivial, and it poses a threat to democracies and societies in ways that are not always immediately visible. Because the threat is broad, the answer must be strong, organized and collective. France, like the European Union, has made the fight against disinformation a strategic priority. The French approach is built on four guiding principles. The first is transparency, which means the state must be clear about its actions and avoid becoming an echo of the same manipulative practices it condemns. The second is targeted action against inauthentic behavior, rather than restricting legitimate expression. The third is responding with factual evidence, because truth is the most powerful tool a democracy has. The fourth is an ethical red line: even when adversaries lie, France will not allow itself to spread false information in return. These principles are not just abstract values. Since 2021, an inter-ministerial unit has been carrying out constant monitoring and technical analysis of information manipulation. The Foreign Ministry has also established a new department that operates surveillance across different time zones, ensuring that the state can respond around the clock. There is a dedicated mechanism for countering content that damages France’s image, allowing the government to react in real time, protect diplomatic initiatives, and deter malicious actors who now know that their attacks may be exposed and answered. These tools, she implied, are not weapons against speech but instruments of defense against those who would abuse speech to dismantle democracy.
Yet Chevrier Kolacko insisted that the long-term fight is not merely about monitoring and exposure. It is about building resilience, both in institutions and in the public itself. That is why France has invested heavily in media literacy in schools, public information campaigns and professional training for teachers, journalists and public officials. Citizens who understand how algorithms work, how false narratives are constructed and how to verify sources are far harder to manipulate. She also spoke passionately about the importance of supporting independent media and investigative journalism. Journalists, she said, act as an antidote to the “pandemic” of disinformation that threatens democratic societies and permeates every corner of the public sphere. France is committed to helping them, not only through legal protections but also through financing independent newsrooms, documentaries and new formats aimed at younger audiences. All of these elements have been brought together into a coherent national strategy to combat information manipulation. The strategy has four major goals: strengthen the resilience of society, regulate platforms and artificial intelligence, improve the state’s ability to respond operationally, and cooperate with allies. The final point is crucial. France does not believe it can succeed alone. The Ambassador concluded by underlining the importance of collective action, not just by European Union members but by all allied democracies. In an environment where information is constantly weaponized, solidarity becomes a form of defense. No country may be able to stop disinformation on its own, but together they can create a network of vigilance and response that makes manipulation far more costly.
Christodoulos Ioannou then brought the discussion home by exploring the social and political conditions that make disinformation so effective. He argued that there is a clear political dimension to this phenomenon. Disinformation targets political systems and democratic institutions, but it often avoids direct confrontation. Instead, it works through the electoral base, exploiting existing political vulnerabilities in order to influence politicians indirectly. It can also amplify marginal voices, giving extreme positions a level of visibility they would never have earned organically. Ioannou was careful to draw an important distinction: the economic crisis and the pandemic did not create disinformation, but they did dramatically reinforce it and provide fertile ground for its spread. He recalled the period of vaccination campaigns, when false claims about vaccines flourished, and the economic crises in Greece and Cyprus, when marginalised movements gained real traction by exploiting social mistrust toward governments and state structures. People who felt abandoned by institutions were more vulnerable to narratives that told them the system was broken or lying to them. Tatham agreed and added a further layer to this analysis. Those who spread disinformation, he said, often look for issues that are already controversial or sensitive and use them to undermine national cohesion. The pandemic was a textbook example, with fears around vaccination exploited and misinformation spread about the effectiveness and risks of vaccines. Migration is another classic issue, he observed, where disinformation exaggerates the scale of the threat and preys on people’s insecurities. At its heart, Tatham argued, misinformation exploits our vulnerabilities. A democratic response, therefore, must be twofold: it must expose the lies, and it must also address the underlying weaknesses that make lies appealing. The most robust defenses are not only technical but social; they involve reducing alienation, rebuilding trust and ensuring that citizens feel their institutions are genuinely on their side.
The conversation at the Cyprus Forum ended not with a single answer, but with a coherent and hopeful vision for what democracies can do together. The speakers made clear that disinformation is not an unstoppable force; it is a challenge that can be contained when it is met with clarity, cooperation and courage. Detection must be paired with public response. National strategies must be supported by international frameworks. State action must be balanced by media literacy, independent journalism and a vibrant public sphere where citizens are empowered to distinguish truth from manipulation. Tatham’s message was that shared values must be translated into shared action. Chevrier Kolacko added that resilience is built through transparency, education and a refusal to abandon one’s own ethical standards. Ioannou reminded everyone that disinformation grows in the cracks of society, and that repairing those cracks is as urgent as exposing falsehood. Taken together, these perspectives form a practical path forward. Democracies must cooperate more closely, share intelligence, denounce common threats in common voice, and support the countries most exposed to manipulation. They must invest in their own citizens, teaching them not what to think but how to think critically. They must support journalists who ask hard questions and refuse to be used as instruments of propaganda. And they must remain alert to the fact that every future crisis, whether a pandemic, an economic collapse or a war, will be used by manipulators to sow chaos and division. The question is not whether such attempts will come; they will. The question is whether democratic societies will be ready. The gathering in Nicosia suggested that readiness is increasing. It offered no illusions about the scale of the threat, but it also offered a clear-eyed belief in the power of cooperation, truth and resilience. The fight against disinformation is, in the end, a fight for the meaning of democracy itself. And with the collective resolve demonstrated in that room, it is a fight that democracies can still win.