Election security is often talked about in technical terms—firewalls, databases, threat actors, and infrastructure. But at its heart, it is something far more personal. It is about whether ordinary people feel safe showing up to vote, whether they trust that their ballot counts, and whether they believe the system still works for them. In a time of deep social unrest and rising political tension, safeguarding elections means more than protecting machines and networks; it means protecting the very idea that every American voice matters. To better understand this complex landscape, I spoke with Mike Rogers, Chief Security Analyst at International SOS, a security intelligence expert with deep experience in forecasting threats, assessing vulnerabilities, and planning for contingencies across the Americas. His insights remind us that election security is not abstract. It touches every community, every polling place, every local election worker, and every citizen who feels anxious about the state of democracy. The goal is not just to prevent attacks, but to preserve confidence—so that when people cast their votes, they genuinely believe those votes will be heard. That sense of assurance is fragile, and it must be defended with both technical vigilance and human understanding.
When it comes to cyber threats, Rogers offers a reassuring yet cautionary perspective. By and large, U.S. elections are considered safe. Agencies like the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, along with state and local institutions, provide election officials with substantial resources to protect voter information, networks, and digital systems. But that does not mean the danger has disappeared. A wide range of threat actors—including foreign state-affiliated groups, domestic criminals, and extremist organizations—will likely try to exploit vulnerabilities in the electoral infrastructure for political or financial gain. They are often looking for weak points in voter registration systems, state and local websites, and the digital tools that support the voting process. Some of the most concerning risks this election cycle involve AI-driven disinformation, phishing attacks, and domain-based deception. For example, thousands of credentials linked to major political fundraising platforms have already been exposed in security incidents. Malicious actors can easily create fake domains designed to look like legitimate news organizations, making it increasingly difficult for voters to tell the difference between accurate reporting and fabricated content. This is not just a technical headache; it is a direct assault on the public’s ability to make informed decisions. When people cannot trust what they read online, they may become cynical, confused, or detached. The human cost is real: citizens may disengage, spread false information to friends and family, or question the legitimacy of results that were actually free and fair. Rogers’ message is clear: while the foundations of election security are strong, the digital battlefield is constantly evolving, and staying ahead requires constant awareness and adaptation.
Physical threats are equally serious, and Rogers explains that election periods in the U.S. generally heighten the overall threat environment. This means the chances of politically motivated violence increase, even if the number of people willing to act violently remains small. The relentless coverage of political campaigns, combined with the bitter, existential tone that often surrounds consequential elections, creates an unhealthy information environment. Social media amplifies every outrage, every conspiracy theory, and every fear, leaving some individuals overwhelmed, radicalized, or in crisis. For those with extremist ideologies or who are emotionally unstable, this can be a dangerous trigger. Rogers notes that sensitive sites and events—political rallies, protests, election offices, media buildings, and businesses associated with politicians—are likely targets. Political figures, election workers, and other officials face the most acute threats. In recent elections, poll workers have been harassed and intimidated simply for doing their jobs. Voting locations may receive bomb threats or other hoaxes, especially in tightly contested districts. These incidents can disrupt voting and create an atmosphere of fear. Perhaps the most important point Rogers makes is that the information environment and the physical security landscape are deeply connected. When the public is exposed to emotionally charged, politically fraught, and low-trust messaging, it increases the likelihood that a small number of aggrieved or radicalized individuals will take real-world action against candidates, supporters, party offices, campaign events, or businesses linked to the electoral process. In other words, what happens online does not stay online. It can spill into the streets, into polling places, and into the daily lives of people who simply want to participate in democracy. Protecting against physical threats, therefore, requires more than extra security guards; it requires calming the rhetoric and rebuilding a shared sense of reality.
Disinformation plays a central role in shaping election security, and Rogers emphasizes that the broader information environment is crucial to understanding the balance of risk. The creation and spread of provocative false narratives—especially those that question the integrity of the election—can have a direct impact on the likelihood of political violence. The speed with which these narratives are debunked or, conversely, amplified by media and government figures matters a great deal. When false claims are allowed to fester, they become deeply embedded in people’s beliefs. AI-generated deepfakes, deceptive domains, and manipulated content only intensify political polarization and reduce voter trust. Rogers also highlights a particularly insidious tactic: threat actors may spread false information about the safety or legitimacy of specific voting methods, such as in-person voting, absentee ballots, or mail-in voting. They might target particular voting locations with rumors of danger or chaos, discouraging people from showing up at all. Similarly, fabricated stories of voter intimidation or harassment can have a chilling effect on turnout—even if no actual threat exists. The goal of disinformation is not always to change someone’s vote; sometimes it is simply to make them doubt the process, to make them feel powerless, or to persuade them that participation is pointless. This erosion of trust is one of the most dangerous consequences of disinformation. It undermines the shared belief that elections are fair and that every citizen’s participation matters. Rogers’ analysis suggests that we must treat disinformation not just as a nuisance, but as a serious security threat that can fuel both physical violence and democratic decay. Countering it requires coordinated efforts by technology companies, government agencies, media organizations, and ordinary citizens who pause before sharing something that stirs anger or fear.
So what can be done to mitigate these threats? Rogers advises organizations to take a proactive approach to risk management. This begins with mapping organization-wide exposure to sensitive sites and venues, including polling locations, government buildings, protest flashpoints, and other places tied to the electoral process. Businesses should establish clear triggers for adjusting their security posture, test emergency communication channels, and run tabletop exercises to evaluate their crisis management capabilities. These drills help identify weaknesses and allow teams to practice their response before a real incident occurs. Rogers also stresses the importance of preparing for the possibility that political tensions affect the workplace itself. Many employees talk about politics at work, and a surprising number find it difficult to collaborate with colleagues who hold different views. Conflict can escalate quickly during an emotionally charged election season. Employers should communicate company policies and resources ahead of time, and make sure response and de-escalation procedures are clearly understood by relevant teams. Creating a workplace culture that respects diverse perspectives while maintaining professionalism is not easy, but it is necessary. Beyond organizational preparedness, Rogers’ advice points to a broader responsibility: we all need to be more mindful of the information we consume and share. We should verify before sharing, question suspicious content, and resist the urge to demonize those who disagree with us. Election security is not solely the job of cybersecurity experts or law enforcement. It is a shared responsibility that involves election officials, political leaders, media figures, businesses, and citizens alike. By working together and staying calm, we can reduce the chances of violence and protect the integrity of the democratic process.
Ultimately, the conversation with Mike Rogers offers both a warning and a source of hope. The threats to U.S. elections are real, and they are evolving. Cyberattacks aimed at undermining trust, physical violence driven by political extremism, and disinformation that poisons public discourse all pose significant challenges. But Rogers also reminds us that the systems in place are strong, and with proactive planning, awareness, and cooperation, these risks can be managed. Election security is ultimately about people—about protecting their right to speak, to choose, and to shape the future of their communities. It is about election workers who show up despite threats, voters who wait in line despite bad weather, and neighbors who respect one another despite their differences. Defending the integrity of elections means defending the unseen foundation of democracy: the shared belief that peaceful, honest processes can resolve disagreements without violence. As the election approaches, we should remember that the quiet act of voting is an act of courage and faith. It is a declaration that we still believe in something larger than ourselves. By protecting that belief—through vigilance, empathy, and a commitment to truth—we protect not just the ballot box, but the soul of the nation. The road ahead may be uncertain, but it is not hopeless. If we choose to engage with care, to listen with humility, and to safeguard both the systems and the spirit of democracy, we can ensure that every voice is not only heard, but truly counted.