Tunisia’s Digital Battlefield: Disinformation and Manipulation in the Post-Coup Era
Tunisia’s political landscape, already fragile after the 2021 coup d’état, has become increasingly entangled with the pervasive influence of online disinformation and manipulation. The 2024 presidential elections, the first since the coup, witnessed a surge in suspiciously sponsored content, both pro- and anti-regime, flooding social media platforms, particularly Facebook. This digital battleground features advertisements denouncing electoral officials, anonymous profiles with seemingly foreign origins engaging with official government pages, and pro-regime influencers countering perceived online threats, all contributing to a climate of distrust and manufactured narratives. This amplified online activity reflects a shift from localized disinformation efforts to a sophisticated industry operating on an international scale, raising serious concerns about the future of Tunisian democracy.
The prevalence of Facebook in Tunisia’s political discourse makes it a prime target for manipulation campaigns. While disinformation has long been present, the recent escalation represents a concerning evolution. The proliferation of troll profiles, fake accounts creating artificial popularity for certain ideas, and coordinated campaigns designed to manipulate public opinion represent an increasingly industrialized approach to disinformation. This manipulation blurs the lines between genuine public sentiment and manufactured narratives, potentially eroding public trust and distorting the democratic process. Understanding the nuances between misinformation (false information intended to harm), disinformation (false information shared unintentionally), and malinformation (true information used to harm) is crucial in navigating this complex landscape.
The 2019 presidential elections served as an early warning sign of the growing threat of online manipulation. Investigations uncovered evidence of coordinated campaigns involving fake accounts, misleading content, and the manipulation of public opinion through social media platforms. Foreign companies, like the Israeli firm Archimedes Group, and domestic entities, such as Ureputation, were implicated in these efforts, often utilizing seemingly neutral journalistic platforms to disseminate manipulated narratives. The proliferation of unofficial support pages for candidates, including then-candidate Kais Saied, further highlighted the potential for exploiting social media to bypass traditional campaign regulations and potentially mislead voters.
The events of July 25, 2021, marked a pivotal moment in both Tunisian politics and the digital sphere. President Saied’s suspension of parliamentary activities was preceded and accompanied by significant social media mobilization, raising questions about the authenticity and potential manipulation of online activity. While the extent of external influence remains uncertain, researchers have noted the involvement of accounts linked to regional actors like the UAE, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia, suggesting the possibility of coordinated efforts to shape public opinion and amplify certain narratives.
Beyond the political sphere, the manipulation tactics employed online have extended to increasingly dangerous targets, including migrants from sub-Saharan Africa. A hate campaign, fueled by false rumors and xenophobic rhetoric, infiltrated social media platforms, culminating in President Saied’s inflammatory remarks in 2023. This campaign, mirroring similar movements in other countries, utilizes a potent mix of historical revisionism, nationalist sentiment, and anti-migrant rhetoric, with common themes and symbols suggesting a coordinated, albeit covert, effort. The ease with which such narratives spread across platforms like Facebook, TikTok, and X (formerly Twitter), underscores the need for more effective content moderation strategies, particularly in languages and dialects beyond English.
The mechanics of online manipulation in Tunisia involve a complex network of actors, from "architects of misinformation" who design campaigns to anonymous influencers who disseminate manipulated content and fake account operators who create artificial engagement. These operations often resemble legitimate digital communications companies, obscuring their true purpose and making them difficult to regulate. The exploitation of precarious employment conditions, particularly among young people, further fuels this industry. The lack of effective oversight, coupled with the paid verification systems on platforms like X, contributes to a climate where misinformation can thrive under the guise of authenticity.
The future of Tunisia’s digital space, and indeed its democracy, hinges on addressing the growing threat of online manipulation. The existing regulatory framework, as exemplified by Decree-Law 54, has proven inadequate, often being used to stifle dissent rather than combat disinformation. Holding social media platforms accountable for content moderation, particularly in Arabic dialects, is crucial. Increased investment in research, focusing on the specific dynamics of disinformation in the region, its impact on political and social behavior, and the actors behind these campaigns, is essential. Fact-checking alone is insufficient; fostering critical media literacy among users is vital in building resilience against manipulation. Finally, activists and pro-democracy movements must grapple with the strategic challenges posed by the increasingly manipulated digital landscape, considering new approaches to online engagement that can effectively counter the pervasive influence of disinformation.
