Russia’s Global Footprint: A Multifaceted Strategy Beyond Opportunism
The narrative of Russia’s foreign policy often centers on opportunism, particularly in the Global South, where Moscow has swiftly established partnerships with ruling juntas in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger. Similarly, Russia positions itself as a steadfast ally to leaders facing challenges, as seen in Sudan and Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, the Kremlin has forged alliances with isolated regimes like North Korea, Eritrea, and Equatorial Guinea. While this opportunistic lens captures a certain aspect of Russian foreign policy, it overlooks the depth and breadth of Moscow’s long-term strategic engagements worldwide.
Beyond opportunistic alliances, Russia maintains enduring partnerships, exemplified by the 15-year-old BRICS alliance, recently expanded to include Egypt, Ethiopia, and Iran. Long-standing bilateral relationships, some dating back to the Cold War, persist with nations such as Algeria, Angola, and Vietnam. Since the Soviet Union’s collapse, Russia has cultivated substantial partnerships with countries like Mexico, Pakistan, and Venezuela, which weren’t previously close Soviet allies. Moreover, some Cold War-era partnerships, including those with Cuba, Iraq, and Nicaragua, have been revitalized. These diverse partnerships underscore a broader, more strategic approach to Russian foreign policy, transcending mere opportunism.
Despite the repercussions of its war against Ukraine, Russia has maintained its global presence through a proactive strategy focusing on three key pillars: business ties, covert operations, and disinformation campaigns. These interconnected elements bolster Russia’s claim to great power status and project the narrative of the Ukraine conflict onto the global stage. By leveraging these tools, Russia seeks to expand its influence, counter Western narratives, and solidify its position as a key player in international affairs.
Economic Influence and Elite Capture: Russian Companies as Tools of Foreign Policy
The Russian economy presents a paradox. Despite being smaller than Canada’s, resource-dependent, and heavily sanctioned, it displays resilience and boasts large companies with global reach, particularly in defense and energy sectors. These companies, often state-owned or state-aligned, serve as instruments of influence and elite capture. Rostec, a state-owned conglomerate, has been instrumental in military modernization programs in several countries. Energy giants like Gazprom, Lukoil, Rosneft, and Tatneft operate numerous international projects, while Rosatom, the state-owned nuclear power company, is involved in building nuclear facilities and supplying fuel worldwide.
Although economic sanctions and global instability have impacted Russian international projects, their global scope remains significant. The Kremlin employs these companies for “elite capture,” strategically investing to gain disproportionate influence within certain governments. This tactic involves turning a blind eye to the misuse of funds by local politicians to maintain patronage networks. Subsequently, these captured officials become reliant on Russian support, making them susceptible to Kremlin pressure and less responsive to their constituents. This leverage allows Russia to advance its foreign policy agenda, secure advantageous deals for its state-controlled companies, and promote a preference for non-democratic governance. China employs a similar playbook, utilizing investment and regime support to advance its foreign policy objectives and its preference for autocratic regimes.
A prime example of Russia’s elite capture strategy was the attempted nuclear power plant deal with South Africa under President Jacob Zuma. The opaque deal, shrouded in controversy and allegations of personal enrichment for Zuma, was ultimately thwarted by South Africa’s robust system of checks and balances and a vibrant civil society. This case illustrates the potential risks and challenges associated with Russia’s economic engagement strategies, particularly in countries with strong democratic institutions.
Covert Operations and Intelligence Gathering: The Shadowy Side of Russian Influence
Beyond economic leverage, Russia offers local incumbents intelligence and military support, often under the guise of counterterrorism or anti-drug trafficking efforts. In return, these incumbents adopt pro-Russian foreign policies, advocate for Russia in international forums, and secure mining deals, often at the expense of Western interests. The covert nature of these operations is crucial, with Russia’s military intelligence (GRU) playing a central role. Groups like the Wagner Group, operating under the GRU’s umbrella, carry out these clandestine operations. While the Ukraine war has raised questions about Russia’s capacity to sustain these overseas operations, several countries continue to host Russian deployments and Wagner-linked activities.
Russia’s global intelligence network extends far beyond these overt deployments. Bilateral intelligence-sharing agreements with foreign governments bolster this network. In Latin America, for instance, while the Wagner Group’s presence has diminished, Russian intelligence activities persist, focusing on covert operations and intelligence gathering. Similarly, Cuba and Nicaragua host Russian officers engaged in regional intelligence activities targeting the Caribbean and the United States. These covert ties also facilitate sanctions evasion, enabling Russian companies to repatriate profits and procure controlled goods. Less overt but equally insidious are Russian election monitoring organizations, often fronts for intelligence collection and electoral interference. These organizations employ tactics like manipulated exit polls, disinformation campaigns, and certification of fraudulent election results to undermine democratic processes in countries across Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East.
Disinformation Campaigns: Shaping Narratives and Sowing Discord
Russian disinformation campaigns, while a form of covert operation, warrant separate attention. They represent a low-cost, low-risk strategy with potentially high impact. State-controlled media, troll farms, local contractors, and even Russian embassies and cultural centers abroad disseminate disinformation, influencing local narratives and decision-makers. These campaigns are pervasive, affecting nations across Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia, shaping public opinion and undermining trust in democratic institutions.
Russian disinformation operates on two levels: conflict generation and strategic narratives. Internal documents reveal a deliberate focus on konfliktologiya, the study of conflict generation. By exploiting societal divisions and wedge issues, Russian disinformation aims to erode trust in institutions, particularly in democratic states, and bolster local partners aligned with Kremlin objectives. For instance, disinformation campaigns targeting UN peacekeeping missions in the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Mali serve to legitimize Russian military presence in these countries.
Underlying the diverse manifestations of Russian disinformation are consistent strategic narratives: Russia as the righteous victor of World War II, Russia as a constant victim of international conspiracies, the US as an aggressor, and the West as decadent. These narratives adapt to specific regions and contexts. In Africa, Russia employs an anti-colonial narrative, portraying Europe and the US as inherently exploitative. In Latin America, it leverages pre-existing anti-American sentiments. Globally, it seeks to justify the invasion of Ukraine through a fabricated narrative of "denazification." These narratives, consistently woven through various disinformation campaigns, promote a worldview conducive to Russian foreign policy objectives.
Combating Russian Influence: A Call for European Action
Russia’s global influence campaign relies on a combination of corrupt dealings, covert operations, and disinformation, all of which contribute to its great power aspirations. This strategy is not limited to the Global South, as these tools are deployed against countries in the Global North as well. Europe faces direct threats from Russia’s shadow war, including espionage, sabotage, and influence operations. To counter the Kremlin’s global campaign, Europe must prioritize its own security by confronting these threats head-on. Globally, Europe should collaborate with those resisting Russian elite capture, particularly civil society organizations and journalists. Supporting initiatives that expose Russian disinformation, such as Code for Africa and Cazadores de Fake News, is crucial, as is highlighting Russia’s corrupt dealings to counter its anti-colonial narratives.
Beyond countering malign influence, Europe must position itself as a reliable partner in trade and investment. Initiatives like the Global Gateway play a key role in competing with Russian companies internationally. Crucially, these efforts must be accompanied by a narrative of equal partnership and pragmatic engagement that appeals to governments advocating for non-alignment. By combining robust countermeasures against Russian malign influence with a constructive approach to international partnership, Europe can effectively challenge the Kremlin’s global ambitions and offer a viable alternative to countries seeking a balanced relationship with global powers.
