Poland’s Vulnerability to Disinformation Laid Bare in New Report
A damning report released by a Polish governmental commission has exposed the country’s susceptibility to foreign disinformation campaigns, primarily orchestrated by Russia. The report, compiled by the commission’s disinformation task force, meticulously analyzes the period from the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 and reveals a concerning pattern of insufficient and fragmented countermeasures by Polish authorities. The commission, led by Gen. Jarosław Stróżyk, head of Poland’s Military Counterintelligence Service, delivered a stark warning: Poland must drastically enhance its efforts to combat these insidious information operations.
The commission’s findings paint a picture of a nation grappling with the sophisticated tactics of a determined adversary. Russia, according to the report, aims to achieve "informational dominance" by manipulating public discourse and infiltrating digital networks. Their arsenal includes a range of methods, from traditional propaganda and psychological campaigns to cutting-edge cyberattacks and hacking intrusions. The report specifically identifies the notorious hacker group Ghostwriter/UNC 1151, believed to be instrumental in destabilizing Central European politics, as a key player in these operations. Russia’s financial commitment to these activities is estimated to be between USD 2 billion and USD 4 billion annually, highlighting the scale and seriousness of the threat.
The report’s most critical assessment focuses on the inadequacy of Poland’s response. It labels the country’s counter-disinformation efforts as "insufficient, ad hoc, inconsistent, and often superficial." Polish institutions, including the foreign ministry, are criticized for their lack of coordination and the absence of a comprehensive long-term strategy. Instead of proactively addressing the threat, countermeasures have largely been limited to passive monitoring, sporadic training, and vague cooperation guidelines. Furthermore, the report accuses previous Polish administrations of inaction despite possessing intelligence on individuals and organizations actively disseminating pro-Russian and pro-Belarusian disinformation, effectively weakening Poland’s ability to counter these threats.
A particularly egregious example of this failure is the 2015 incident involving the NATO Counterintelligence Center of Excellence in Warsaw. The report details the forced entry and disruption of the center by associates of then-Defense Minister Antoni Macierewicz, led by his aide Bartłomiej Misiewicz. This act, which involved breaking locks and forcing open safes containing classified materials, is described as a major setback for Poland and NATO’s capacity to combat cognitive warfare. The center, intended to be a crucial hub for countering Russian disinformation, had only been operational for a few months before this incident effectively crippled its functionality. Two independent legal analyses later confirmed that the center was an international entity outside the jurisdiction of Polish officials, further highlighting the gravity of the breach.
The 80-page report, publicly accessible on the justice ministry’s website, provides a comprehensive overview of Russian cognitive warfare techniques deployed against Poland. It meticulously details Russia’s strategies, dissects major propaganda narratives, and assesses Poland’s preparedness to counteract these tactics. The report includes specific case studies examining disinformation campaigns related to the COVID-19 pandemic, the migration crisis at the Polish-Belarusian border, climate change, and Russian interference in the 2024 elections in Georgia, Moldova, and Romania, offering valuable insights into the evolving nature of these information operations.
Gen. Stróżyk emphasized the urgency of the situation, stating that Poland must significantly strengthen its institutional response. He underscored the report’s central conclusion: Poland needs to do considerably more, both institutionally and practically, to combat disinformation originating from Russia and Belarus, as well as other emerging threats in the information landscape. The report highlights several areas requiring immediate attention, including the previous government’s decision to scrap plans for a dedicated cybersecurity department within the Internal Security Agency in 2016 and the understaffing and ineffectiveness of the foreign ministry’s Strategic Communications Unit and the National Research Institute’s Disinformation Prevention Department.
Among the key recommendations put forth by the commission are enhanced cooperation between government authorities and media outlets, particularly during crises, to prevent information gaps and combat the spread of disinformation. This involves providing journalists with direct access to reliable information sources, including eyewitnesses and uncensored visual materials. The commission also advocates for the declassification and publication of intelligence reports on disinformation threats to increase public awareness and understanding. Crucially, the report calls for a comprehensive national anti-disinformation strategy incorporating input from experts, journalists, and civil society organizations, backed by increased public funding to ensure its effectiveness. Gen. Stróżyk announced that the commission will soon submit a report to the prosecutor’s office concerning the dismantling of regional offices of the Internal Security Agency under the previous government, a move previously criticized for weakening Poland’s intelligence capabilities. The commission, established in May 2023 as an advisory body to the prime minister, will continue its work analyzing state documents, academic research, and expert reports to assess foreign influence on Polish public life. The next report is expected in March.
