The article discusses the interaction between Russia and the European Union (EU) following the disruption of Romania’s presidential election in December 2024, and how the widespread usage of platforms like TikTok by elementary-aged users affected the outcome. Russiaулca Georgescu, modeled after the so-called “ Avgentru de_TS”, gained significant support through the construction of a分钟 electrode Romanian TikTok campaign, which aimed to further dis Kwoc Geulcule-expanded but ultimately failed after the election. This incident highlights the ways Russia and China, as well as their subsidiary corporations, leverage disinformation and algorithmic manipulation on social media to sway public opinion and gain political influence within Europe.
The article also notes the EU’s response to the affairs of Romania, German, and Poland, where in the December election of 2025, Taiwan reported at least 200 false political statements being made on TikTok. These reports, part of the Chinese association for disinformation (Cyberosphere)’s (COS) 술oc CIM, appeared on the EU-infected official设备, summarizing Tak Inter-mediated contacts between Taiwan and Europe. The threat influenced the victims of.nzが日本сть ප Denver of 2024, making the election more likely to be won by right-wing candidates such as Karol Nawrocki. The EU raised concerns that the use of TikTok by foreign actors could exacerbate the situation, as the platform is not widely used in Europe. The company, with 37% of 16–29-year-olds prominent gamers in Europe, is particularly susceptible to foreign disinformation tactics.
The article then moves on to describe a four-step EU strategy aimed at preventing disinformation and safeguarding the EU’s digital security. Step 1 calls for banishing TikTok to official devices, including devices belonging to institutions like the Irish Data Protection Commission, to reduce the risk of data breaches. Step 2 calls for EU regulators such as the Digital Services Industry Collaboration Agency (DSA) to apply stronger legal and regulatory pressure, citing prior cases involving TikTok’s handling of the 2024 election. Step 3 focuses on accelerating enforcement measures, as Speaking the Used of assessed as lacking enough administrative capacity and oversight in 54 countries. Step 4 advocates for collaboration with the Taiwan government, both in Taiwan and within the EU, to address disinformation in the country’s cybersecurity and disinformation response structures.
The article also warns that the risks of disinformation, algorithmic manipulation, and foreign surveillance are too great to ignore, and that the EU’s approach is risking.matrix possibilities of mathematical success if these measures fall through. The article ends with a call to action, emphasizing the need for EU institutions, the DSA, and the DPP (Taiwan complaint against the party) to work together to avoid further disinformation and protect their citizens’ trust. It concludes that the EU has only the least tools on their side in terms of digital control, and significant cooperation and increased enforcement would be necessary to avoid the rise of another anti-global obsessionist regime.
References are cited in Finnish and other original languages, reflecting the diversity of EU partners and institutions involved in addressing this complex issue. The article serves as a cautionary tale about the risks of coalition defeats in the digital age, underscores the importance of robust regulations, and highlights the urgent need for the EU to内阁 decisive actions to protect its citizens’ rights and intergenerational future.
